The Right to an Independent Judiciary and the Avoidance of Constitutional Conflict: The Burger Court’s Flawed Reasoning in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit and Its Unfortunate Legacy by Kastenberg, Joshua E
St. Mary's Journal on Legal Malpractice & 
Ethics 
Volume 8 Number 1 Article 3 
May 2018 
The Right to an Independent Judiciary and the Avoidance of 
Constitutional Conflict: The Burger Court’s Flawed Reasoning in 
Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit and Its 
Unfortunate Legacy 
Joshua E. Kastenberg 
jkastenberg@yahoo.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/lmej 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Judges Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal Biography 
Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, Legal History Commons, Legal 
Profession Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, and the 
Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Right to an Independent Judiciary and the Avoidance of Constitutional 
Conflict: The Burger Court’s Flawed Reasoning in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit and Its 
Unfortunate Legacy, 8 ST. MARY'S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS (2018). 
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/lmej/vol8/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St. 
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Journal on Legal Malpractice & Ethics by an 






The Right to an Independent Judiciary and the Avoidance 
of Constitutional Conflict: The Burger Court’s Flawed 
Reasoning in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit 
and Its Unfortunate Legacy 
Abstract.  In 1970, the United States Supreme Court issued Chandler v. 
Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit in which five Justices determined that the 
federal courts of appeals possessed an administrative authority to manage the 
district court judges within an appellate court’s respective circuit.  The decision 
enabled the Tenth Circuit to decide the fitness of a judge to preside over cases 
without a formal motion from a litigant.  Although Congress had enabled the 
courts of appeals to oversee basic judicial functions (such as temporarily 
assigning district court judges to overworked districts), Congress did not intend 
to grant the power to remove the judicial duties of a district court judge; such 
an act could equate to a judicial impeachment by the Judicial Branch.  The 
Justices who dissented in Chandler, Hugo Black and William O. Douglas, argued 
that the Court had taken a substantial step in undermining the independence of 
the Nation’s federal trial judges.  Although Congress has since statutorily 
reduced the impact of Chandler, it remains a flawed influence on the 
investigation and potential disciplining of the Nation’s federal judges.  This 
Article examines the underlying causes and impact of Chandler, and suggests an 
argument for curtailing the decision’s impact by limiting it to purely 
administrative matters. 
Author.  Joshua Kastenberg is a professor at the University of New Mexico 
School of Law.  Prior to joining the faculty there, he served over two decades 
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in the United States Air Force as a judge advocate, including the last five as a 
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When the Article III judiciary is called upon to police itself after receiving 
allegations of judicial malfeasance, or a judge’s inability to advance cases, the 
courts of appeals will investigate through a process which involves an 
administrative institution known as a judicial council.1  The investigation 
operates much like an administrative proceeding, but it is largely closeted 
from the public and—with only one minor step—there is a lack of a 
meaningful standard of proof employed throughout.2  The process has 
improved since its inception, but it remains flawed—subjecting federal 
judges (other than Supreme Court Justices) to a process which does not 
mirror the standards United States courts employ in cases and hearings.3  In 
essence, the structure which exists today for internal judicial investigations 
can be used to undermine the independence of individual trial judges.4  This 
flawed process was shaped by Chief Justice Warren Burger in Chandler v. 
Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit (Chandler II).5 
Issued on June 1, 1970, the Supreme Court recognized in Chandler II that 
the eleven judicial councils possessed the administrative authority to remove 
district court judges from individual cases and from sitting on trials for 
specified periods of time without first requiring a litigant’s appeal.6  This 
decision essentially meant that an appellate court could—on its own and 
without articulating a defined standard of proof—remove a district court 
judge without first requiring a litigant to appeal through a writ of mandamus 
or prohibition.7   
 
1. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S. (Chandler II), 398 U.S. 74, 76 
n.1 (1970) (“Each judicial council shall make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious 
administration of the business of the courts within its circuit.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 332)). 
2. Infra Part I–II. 
3. Infra Part II–III. 
4. Infra Part III–IV. 
5. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S. (Chandler II), 398 U.S. 74 (1970).  
At the time of Chandler II, there were eleven circuit courts of appeals including the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  See Thomas E. Baker, A Legislative History of the Creation of the 
Eleventh Circuit, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 363, 363 (1992) (emphasizing the creation of the “new eleventh 
circuit” occurred in 1981).  This new circuit, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, was created 
from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act 
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 5, 94 Stat. 1994, 1994. 
6. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 86 n.7 (“We find nothing in the legislative history [of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 332] to suggest that the Judicial Council was intended to be anything other than an administrative 
body functioning in a very limited area in a narrow sense as a ‘board of directors’ for the circuit.”).  
7. Id. at 91–94 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court’s action had the effect of rejecting the 
appellant’s claim of a right to obtain relief without further proceedings in a lower tribunal.”).   
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Created in 1939, a judicial council is a statutory mechanism that 
authorizes each federal appeals court to administratively manage the federal 
district courts within the circuit.8  Contemporaneous with the Supreme 
Court’s review in Chief Justice Warren Burger in Chandler v. Judicial Council of 
the Tenth Circuit (Chandler I)9 and Chandler II, a number of congressmen, 
including Emanuel Celler (the Chairman of the House Judiciary 
Committee), concluded that because the Constitution vests Congress with 
the sole authority to remove federal judges through the impeachment 
process, the action of appellate court judges in removing a district judge 
from trials through an administrative, rather than appellate, process 
threatened the independence of the Nation’s federal trial judges.10  In 
principle, Congressman Celler’s Committee determined that the 
administrative removal of a trial judge constituted an end run around both 
the Legislative Branch’s power and the rights of litigants to contest the 
removal.11  In fact, more than one legislator argued that the existence of 
such an administrative process was a blatant unconstitutional extension of 
judicial power.12  Although the Supreme Court infrequently cites to 
 
8. See id. at 76 n.1 (majority opinion) (discussing a judicial council’s role in making “necessary 
orders for the effective and expeditious administration . . . within its circuit”). 
 9. Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S. (Chandler I), 382 U.S. 1003 
(1966).  
10. Cf. Letter from Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm., to Sam Ervin, 
U.S. Senator (Jan. 26, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress) (“I am watching developments [of 
Chandler] with a careful eye.  I am not unaware of the far-reaching implications in this unprecedented 
matter.”).   
11. See Lee R. West, Biographical Sketch for the Historical Society of the Tenth Circuit on  
Judge Stephen S. Chandler, Jr., TENTH CIR. HIST. SOC’Y, at 13, https://static1.squarespace.com/ 
static/54170cd0e4b00eba52a2db00/t/54516653e4b09c9c97c0b22b/1414620755682/Chandler_bio.p
df [perma.cc/ND5V-3NMS] (emphasizing the House Judiciary Committee’s findings after 
investigating Judge Chandler’s behavior, and urging that “[i]f any of the judges should be removed 
because they are unfit to discharge their responsibilities, the only mechanism provided by the 
Constitution, impeachment, is not available” (citation omitted)). 
12. See Judicial Fitness: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Comm. on 
the Judiciary U.S. S., 89th Cong., pt. I, at 5 (1966) [hereinafter U.S. S. Judicial Fitness Hearings] (statement 
of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., as presented by Sen. Joseph D. Tydings, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on 
Improvements in Judicial Mach.) (“The action of the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit in dismissing 
Judge Chandler was unwarranted and precipitous, and I agree completely with Justices Black and 
Douglas that the Supreme Court should have stayed the Order.”); Letter from Emanuel Celler to Sam 
Ervin, supra note 10 (expounding the Supreme Court’s action in Chandler was over-reaching and 
inappropriate).  Further, it is evident some legislators still had faith in a different approach.  In 1966, 
Congressman Harold Royce Gross introduced House Resolution 739 “to inquire into and investigate 
the official conduct” of Judge Chandler.  H.R. Res. 739, 89th Cong. (1966) (enacted). 
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Chandler II,13 the decision serves as an important marker in relations 
between the legislative and judicial branches—not only influencing judicial 
relationships between trial and appellate courts, but also shaping judicial 
ethics.14 
The majority’s decision is brief, and without reading Justice John Harlan’s 
lengthy concurrence or Justice William O. Douglas’s dissent, it might appear 
that the Court casually determined that no constitutional impediment 
existed in the administrative removal of federal trial judges.15  Likewise, the 
majority’s decision is sterilized from any discussion of the constitutional—
if not ethical—implications for the extra-legislative removal and discipline 
of judges.16  As a result, one might infer that Chandler II presents legal 
scholars, not only a study on how Chief Justice Burger led the majority of 
Justices to avoid a significant constitutional issue and remove judicial ethics 
considerations from a decision rife with questions in both categories, but—
because Chief Justice Burger also ignored congressional determinations 
which, if followed, could have reasonably led the Court to issue a ruling 
inapposite of Chandler II—the decision also presents a study in legislative 
and judicial relations. 
Although, normally the judiciary should immunize itself from political 
considerations, in this particular instance, it is noteworthy that in 1939 
Congress created the judicial councils by passing the Administrative Office 
Act;17 and, between 1965 and 1969, the House Judiciary Committee 
determined that the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit violated that 
Act.18  Additionally, Congressman Celler—a long-serving congressman and 
 
13. Only eight Supreme Court cases appear to use Chandler II as a citing reference.  Search of 
U.S. Supreme Court Cases Citing Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., WESTLAW, 
https://next.westlaw.com (locate Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 398 U.S. 74 
(1970); click the “Citing References” tab; select the “Cases” option; select the “Federal” option; then 
choose “Supreme Court” under the “Jurisdiction” category). 
14. Cf. Carl L. Shipley, Legislative Control of Judicial Behavior, 35 DUKE L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
178, 179–87 (1970) (defining constitutional issues within the Chandler opinion that are fundamental to 
our Nation’s foundation).   
15. See generally Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 74–89 (failing to find a constitutional impediment existed 
in the Judicial Council’s actions).   
16. Id. 
17. Administrative Office Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, 53 Stat. 1223.   
18. See John P. MacKenzie, House Probe Reports Judge Lost Seat Unfairly, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
Dec. 19, 1969, at 12-A (“A secret House Judiciary Committee report has concluded that the Tenth U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals went beyond the law and the Constitution when it stripped Oklahoma Federal 
Judge Stephen S. Chandler of his judicial duties in 1965.”).   
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member of the House Judiciary Committee—assisted in the Act’s 
creation.19 
Chandler II has never been analyzed as a legal history, and particularly not 
so in terms of the jurisdictional positions and motives of the participants, 
including an ad hoc panel of the House Judiciary Committee that 
investigated Judge Chandler as well as two other judges involved in the 
Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit’s actions.20  That House Committee 
panel (headed by Congressman Jack Brooks, a Texas Democrat, William 
St. Onge, a Connecticut Democrat, and Nathan Poff, a Virginia Republican) 
determined that the Judicial Council had acted beyond its statutory and 
constitutional powers in its supervision of Judge Chandler.21  From the time 
of its issuance to the present, Chandler II has occasionally been discussed, 
but there are no articles or books which analyze the interplay between 
Congress and the Supreme Court in regard to the issues leading to the 
decision.  No studies citing to Chandler II analyze how Judge Chandler’s 
conduct and personality (as well as that of Judge Alfred P. Murrah, Judge 
Chandler’s opponent on the Tenth Circuit) affected the Court’s decisional 
processes.  Yet, Judge Chandler’s conduct—both on and off the bench—is 
a reasonable part of the decision’s analysis, in part because newspapers 
ranging from the Daily Oklahoman to the New York Times reported on 
Judge Chandler, making his conduct notorious to the public.22  In addition, 
the Justices deciding Chandler II were also well aware of Judge Chandler’s 
conduct; Justice Hugo Black attended the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council’s 
conference in 1961 and 1964 and was hosted by Judge Chandler during 
 
19. Cf. Peter Graham Fish, The Circuit Councils: Rusty Hinges of Federal Judicial Administration, 37 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 203, 206 (1970) (discussing Congressman Celler’s involvement in the hearing, regarding 
the 1939 Act); Shipley, supra note 14, at 189 (establishing Congressman Celler was Chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee in 1970, and portraying him as a contender in the early effort to address 
the regulation of judicial behavior).   
20. See Shipley, supra note 14, at 178–80 (discussing a few of the participants in the storm 
ultimately leading to the Chandler II opinion). 
21. See Fish, supra note 19, at 232, 240–41 (analyzing the Judicial Council’s overreach in its 
supervision of Judge Chandler). 
22. See U.S. Judge Stephen Chandler, 89; Often Feuded with His Colleagues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1989, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/29/obituaries/us-judge-stephen-chandler-89-often-
feuded-with-his-colleagues.html [perma.cc/F94Z-MZD7] (“Twice [Judge Chandler] was removed 
from hearing lawsuits because of allegations of personal interest or bias and prejudice.”); accord 
Katherine Hatch, Judge’s Role in Two Cases Under Attack, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 19, 1965, at 1 
(covering one of Judge Chandler’s controversies). 
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both.23  In light of Judge Chandler’s well-known exploits, one could 
presume the Court’s avoidance of examining the significant underlying 
issues resulted in a poorly constructed decision. 
This Article is divided into four sections.  The first details the conduct of 
Judge Chandler and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals that lead to the 
issuance of the Council’s Order barring Judge Chandler from serving on 
trials.  This section also presents an analysis underlying the purpose for the 
creation of judicial councils.  Because the Act creating the judicial councils 
had never been challenged in the courts, Judge Chandler’s appeal presented 
a case of first impression when it came before the Supreme Court.24   
The second section of this Article analyzes the legislative branch’s 
investigation into Judge Chandler and the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council, as 
well as the opinions of several legislators who did not take a role in the 
investigation, but did serve on one of Congress’ two judiciary committees 
and opposed both the Council’s actions and the Supreme Court’s rulings.  
Importantly, not only did the House Judiciary Committee conclude that the 
Judicial Council had unconstitutionally exercised a non-existent authority, 
three prominent legislators—including a senator on the Senate Judiciary 
Committee—also criticized the Council’s actions.   
The third section of this Article details the Supreme Court’s deliberative 
findings through the personal correspondences of the Justices involved in 
the decision, as well as the various drafts of the Chandler I and Chandler II 
majority and dissenting opinions.   
The fourth section provides an analysis on how the Court’s majority 
created an unintended consequence in rendering its decision in Chandler II, 
and does so by examining how the judiciary has made use of it.  This Article 
concludes with a suggested applicability guideline for the use of Chandler II 




23. See Letter from Hugo Black, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Stephen Chandler, Chief Judge, 
U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla. (June 29, 1961) (on file with the Library of Congress) 
(commenting favorably on the meeting).  
24. See generally Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 75–76 (addressing the “scope and constitutionality of the 
powers of the Judicial Councils under 28 U.S.C. §§ 137 and 332[,]” and proclaiming the issues as 
questions of first impression). 
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I.    JUDGE CHANDLER, THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT, 
AND OKLAHOMA 
In 1929, Congress formed the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to 
alleviate a growing appellate docket in the Eighth and Seventh Circuits.25  
Then, the Tenth Circuit was composed of the United States Districts for 
Wyoming, Utah, Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, and New Mexico.26  In 
1906, Congress divided the State of Oklahoma into two Territories, 
establishing the start of Oklahoma’s Eastern and Western Districts.27  
Congress created a third district in 1925, titled the United States District for 
the Northern District of Oklahoma.28  In its early history, the Eastern and 
Western Districts shared a judgeship.  For instance, Judge Alfred Murrah 
and Judge Bower Slack Broaddus served as district judges in both districts.29  
Judge Chandler was appointed exclusively to the Western District in 1943, 
and he served on the bench until he took senior status in 1975.30  The Senate 
confirmed him by a close vote of thirty-seven to twenty-eight, with 
thirty-one senators not voting.31  In 1956, as a result of judicial retirements 
and deaths, Judge Chandler became the Chief Judge of Oklahoma’s Western 
 
25. See Arthur J. Stanley, Jr. & Irma S. Russell, The Political and Administrative History of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 66 DENV. L.J. 119, 122 (1982) (indicating the “creation of the 
Tenth Circuit in 1929 was actually the second time a ‘Tenth Circuit’” was created by the judicial system).  
26. See Act of Feb. 28, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-840, ch. 363, 45 Stat. 1346, 1347 (“[T]he [T]enth 
[C]ircuit shall include the districts of Colorado, Wyoming, Utah, Kansas, Oklahoma, and New 
Mexico”); CHARLES L. ZELDEN, THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: PEOPLE, 
PROCESSES, AND POLITICS xxvii (2007) (“This act divided the Eighth Circuit into two circuits, 
organizing the judicial districts of Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming as 
the Tenth Circuit.”).   
27. See Act of June 16, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-234, ch. 3335, § 2, 34 Stat. 267, 268 (enabling the 
Indian Territory and the Territory of Oklahoma).   
28. See Act to Amend Section 101 of the Judicial Code, Pub. L. No. 68-418, ch. 233, § 101, 
43 Stat. 945, 945 (1925) (“The State of Oklahoma is divided into three judicial districts, to be known 
as the northern, the eastern, and the western districts of Oklahoma.”).   
29. See Murrah, Alfred Paul, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/murrah-
alfred-paul [https://perma.cc/JTC6-YFPB] (indicating Judge Murrah concurrently occupied a seat in 
the Western, Eastern, and Northern Districts of Oklahoma); see also Broaddus, Bower Slack, FED. JUD. 
CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/broaddus-bower-slack [https://perma.cc/M2ZC-R5P4] 
(reporting Judge Broaddus replaced Judge Murrah, sitting concurrently in the Western, Eastern, and 
Northern Districts of Oklahoma). 
30. See Chandler, Stephen Sanders, Jr., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/ 
judges/chandler-stephen-sanders-jr. [https://perma.cc/XFT6-KAAP] (indicating Judge Chandler 
served in the Western District from 1943 until 1975).   
31. See West, supra note 11, at 3 (“[Judge] Chandler’s nomination was finally confirmed in May 
of 1943, by the rather narrow margin of 37 yeas and 28 nays, with 31 not voting.”).   
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District.32  In 1965 the other judges in the district included Judge Luther 
Bohanon, Judge Ross Rizley, Judge Alvin Daugherty, and Judge Luther 
Burbank.33  Judge Bohanon, who was a long-time friend of Judge Murrah, 
clashed with Judge Chandler.34 
A. Judge Chandler’s Public and Private Conduct 
Judge Chandler was a contentious judge.  In 1981, Judge A. Leon 
Higginbotham, of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, called 
Judge Chandler “cantankerous to the extreme and in all probability mentally 
ill.”35  Judge Julius Hoffman on the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois was Judge Chandler’s closest judicial 
acquaintance on a federal court, and the two men appear to have had a 
similar demeanor—characterized by angry outbursts at counsel and 
witnesses.36  When Judge Hoffman became well-known for his role in the 
politicized trials of the so-called “Chicago Seven” in 1969, Judge Chandler 
lauded his treatment of that trial’s defense counsel.37  In 1965, Oklahoma’s 
newspaper readers were greeted with front-page news detailing 
Judge Chandler’s various controversies with a local district attorney.38  On 
his death in 1988, the New York Times reported, “Stephen S. Chandler, a 
 
32. See id. at 4 (“[Judge] Chandler was appointed chief justice of the district in 1956, and 
assumed greater administrative duties.”).   
33. See U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma: Judges, FED.  
JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-district-court-western-district-oklahoma-judges 
[https://perma.cc/S67U-TNBN] (listing the judges who have served the Western District of 
Oklahoma and the years in which they served).   
34. See West, supra note 11, at 4 (“[The feud] began to positively boil once Murrah’s long-time 
friend, Luther Bohanon, was appointed judge for the Western District of Oklahoma in 1961.”).   
35. Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 639 F.2d 972, 987 (3d Cir. 1981) (Higginbotham, J., concurring).  
The author wishes to note that because Judge Chandler was still alive, this characterization was not 
only unseemly and unfair to Judge Chandler, but there was no evidence of Judge Chandler suffering 
from a diagnosed mental illness.  Judge Chandler may have been mentally ill, but he may have also 
been irascible. 
36. Cf. Letter from Stephen Chandler, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla., 
to Julius Hoffman, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill. (1970) (on file with the Library of 
Congress) (“All real Americans should be deeply grateful to you.  We need more like you.”).   
37. Cf. Letter from Julius Hoffman, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Ill., to Stephen 
Chandler, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla. (Sept. 10, 1970) (on file with the 
Library of Congress) (“Here is my long delayed expression of appreciation for the kind and generous 
message you sent to me . . . .”).  There was much public notoriety of this trial in which Judge Hoffman 
held the defense counsel in contempt.  See Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic & International Law, 
55 DUKE L.J. 75, 121 (2005) (“The judge in the Chicago 8 case jailed many of the defendants and their 
lawyers for contempt . . . .”).   
38. Hatch, supra note 22. 
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federal judge who often feuded with other judges and lawyers, died at a 
hospital here early Thursday.”39  In 1962, Judge Chandler testified that 
other judges had treated him spitefully, that his telephone had been tapped, 
and that he was afraid of being poisoned.40  On April 21, 1962, the Daily 
Oklahoman headlined its front page: “U.S. Appeals Court Bars 
Judge Chandler from Oil Firm Case[,]” and on a following page: 
“Reprimand Jolts Judge Chandler[.]”41   
In early 1964, Judge Chandler published an article in the American Bar 
Association Journal42 that served notice to the courts of appeals that the 
Nation’s federal trial judges were in constant danger of having their 
independence usurped through the administrative acts of the appellate 
judges.43  Judge Chandler expressed a particular concern regarding the 
appellate courts’ use of judicial councils.44  He may have presciently known 
that he would soon become enmeshed in a dispute with the Judicial Council 
of the Tenth Circuit and sought to create a preemptive legal defense, but the 
record seems silent on this matter.45  Interestingly, the personal collections 
of Senators Samuel Ervin (a North Carolina Democrat) and James Eastland 
(a Mississippi Democrat) contain Judge Chandler’s article, and the 
senators—who both served on the Senate Judiciary Committee—later sided 
with Judge Chandler in the dispute against the Council.46 
 
39. U.S. Judge Stephen Chandler, 89; Often Feuded with His Colleagues, supra note 22. 
40. Cf. West, supra note 11, at 1 (“Chandler was certain that his enemies employed agents to spy 
upon him, tapped his phones, surveilled his house, and stood at the ready to poison his water carafe 
or even strap a bomb beneath the hood of his long white Cadillac convertible.”).   
41. See U.S. Appeals Court Bars Judge Chandler from Oil Firm Case, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 21, 
1962, at 1. 
42. Stephen S. Chandler, The Role of the Trial Judge in the Anglo-American Legal System, 50 A.B.A. J. 
125 (1964). 
43. Id. at 129 (“The judicial reform movement is tending too far in the direction of 
subordinating the administrative authority of the trial judge.”).   
44. See id. at 129–30 (“The inestimable benefits of a judicial system handled by trial judges who 
are answerable to no man, and under no control other than that of their own consciences, could well 
be lost by a change calculated to create the feeling on the part of the judge that he was just another 
employee taking orders from a judicial council acting as a quasi[-]board of directors.” (citation 
omitted)).   
45. Cf. id. at 125 (“It is time to suggest, nevertheless, that [judicial reform] organizations [like 
the Senate Judiciary Committee] have . . . completely overlooked the negative effect on the more 
important fundamental principles as well as the psychological factors that exist in the judicial process.”).   
46. See Nominations of Abe Fortas & Homer Thornberry: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary 
U.S. S., 90th Cong. 2 (1968) [hereinafter Nominations of Fortas & Thornberry Hearing] (listing James 
Eastland and Senator Sam Ervin as members of the Committee on the Judiciary).   
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Judge Chandler was born in Tennessee in 1899.47  He graduated from 
Kansas University’s law school in 1922 and entered into private practice in 
Oklahoma.48  In 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt, on the advice of 
Senator Elmer Thomas, nominated Judge Chandler for a federal 
judgeship.49  It took the Senate three years to hold a vote, and, as noted, 
Judge Chandler was confirmed by bare majority.50  Yet, Judge Chandler had 
powerful friends in Congress; Senator Robert Kerr, a long-serving 
Oklahoman legislator and ally of Lyndon Johnson, had been one of his 
confidants.51   
In 1974, journalist Joseph C. Goulden published The Benchwarmers, a study 
of federal district court judges, including Judge Chandler.52  Although one 
could examine newspaper reports to piece together aspects of 
Judge Chandler’s life (and there is a brief biographical sketch written for the 
Tenth Circuit Historical Society53), one would likely agree that Goulden’s 
book provides a vivid account of Judge Chandler’s legacy.  According to 
Goulden, over the course of his career, Judge Chandler accused 
Judge Murrah and Judge Bohanon of conspiring to force him off the 
 
47. See West, supra note 11, at 2 (“Stephen Chandler was born on September 13, 1899 in Blount 
County, Tennessee, in the shadow of the Great Smokey Mountains.”).   
48. See id. (“After earning his law degree at the University of Kansas in 1922, [Judge] Chandler 
spent 21 years in private practice before being tapped . . . for one of Oklahoma’s three district court 
vacancies.”).   
49. See Chandler, Stephen Sanders, Jr., supra note 30 (showing President F. Roosevelt nominated 
Judge Chandler on February 1, 1943); see also West, supra note 11, at 2 (noting Senator Elmer Thomas 
tapped Judge Chandler for a court vacancy).   
50. See West, supra note 11, at 2–3 (noting Judge Chandler’s nomination was “proposed” to the 
U.S. Department of Justice in 1940, but that he was not confirmed until 1943).   
51. See, e.g., Letter from Burl Hays, Admin. Assistant, Senator Robert S. Kerr, to Stephen 
Chandler, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for West Dist. of Okla. (on file with the Library of Congress) 
(showing the close relationship between Senator Kerr and Judge Chandler through Kerr’s assistant’s 
letter to Judge Chandler stating his desire “to always be able to come by and smoke one of 
[Judge Chandler’s] good cigars and enjoy [Judge Chandler’s] company”). 
52. See generally JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, THE BENCHWARMERS (Weybright & Talley 1974) 
[hereinafter THE BENCHWARMERS] (discussing reigns of several prominent U.S. judges).  This book 
was not without its critics.  For instance, one critic argued that the book concentrated on a small 
number of federal judges to the detriment of the Judiciary as a whole.  See, e.g., James G. France, Review 
of “The Benchwarmers,” By Joseph C. Goulden, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 262, 265 (1975) (book review) (“Here 
the work is, perversely, at its readable best, although admittedly it does not paint a true picture of the 
bulk of the federal judiciary.”). 
53. Lee R. West, Biographical Sketch for the Historical Society of the Tenth Circuit on  
Judge Stephen S. Chandler, Jr., TENTH CIR. HIST. SOC’Y, https://static1.squarespace.com/ 
static/54170cd0e4b00eba52a2db00/t/54516653e4b09c9c97c0b22b/1414620755682/Chandler_bio.p
df [perma.cc/ND5V-3NMS].   
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court.54  But there was also a seamy aspect to Judge Chandler’s conduct.  
He made bad investments in real estate which caused him to fall into debt.55  
He named the particular bank to which he was most indebted the trustee in 
a multi-million-dollar investment corporation’s bankruptcy action, which 
happened to be pending in his court.56  This raised many questions 
surrounding Judge Chandler’s judicial status.57   
Centering on three particular instances of Judge Chandler’s conduct in 
order to highlight questions as to his judicial fitness, temperament, and 
impartiality, it is important to note that Goulden had interviewed 
Judge Chandler, and that he did not portray him as being unethical in the 
same manner that he depicted other judges in his book.58  The first instance 
had to do with Judge Chandler’s handling of the bankruptcy of Selected 
Investments.59  In 1960, Patrick O’Bryan, a tax attorney retained by 
Selected, successfully contested an IRS judgment.60  In an appeal to the 
Tenth Circuit, O’Bryan argued that several banks (and notably the very bank 
where Judge Chandler had property loans) were responsible for Selected’s 
loss of revenue and legal difficulties.61  Judge Chandler had, in fact, invested 
heavily in his daughter’s land development project—a tract of homes 
outside of Oklahoma City called Smiling Hills—and was in debt to the bank 
for thousands of dollars.62  O’Bryan used this point in his arguments.63   
But O’Bryan also had personal difficulties with Judge Chandler.  During 
O’Bryan’s representation of Selected, he billed the company over 
one-million dollars in attorneys’ fees.64  To prove he was entitled to the 
fees, he provided Judge Chandler with a contract purported to have been 
drafted by Selected.65  In 1961, Judge Chandler discovered discrepancies in 
 
54. THE BENCHWARMERS, supra note 52, at 212–13. 
55. Id. at 208. 
56. Id.   
57. Id. at 209. 
58. See generally id. (garnering several judges in the book as unethical, but failing to name 
Judge Chandler amongst them).  In spite of this, Goulden did not turn a blind eye to Judge Chandler’s 
more risqué tendencies.  See France, supra note 52 (“The second chapter . . . records a stirring account 
of the judicial career of the Honorable Stephen S. Chandler . . . .  No phase of the judge’s activities, if 
derogatory, is left untouched.”).   
59. THE BENCHWARMERS, supra note 52, at 216. 
60. Id. at 217. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 220. 
63. Id. at 217–18. 
64. Id. at 221. 
65. Id.  
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the letter-head of the contract and barred O’Bryan from practice in the 
federal courts.66  O’Bryan did not initially deny fabricating the letter, and 
Judge Chandler tried to pressure the United States Attorney into 
prosecuting O’Bryan for perjury.67  When the Justice Department 
determined there was insufficient evidence to seek an indictment, 
Judge Chandler, on his own volition, secured an indictment against O’Bryan 
in a standing grand jury.68  During a pretrial hearing in which O’Bryan 
moved the court to quash the indictment, the United States Attorney opined 
to the trial court that Judge Chandler had departed from his judicial duties 
and pressured the grand jury to indict.69  In response, Judge Chandler 
threatened to hold the United States Attorney in contempt.70  Judge 
Daugherty—one of Judge Chandler’s peers—sided with the United States 
Attorney and dismissed the indictment without prejudice to the 
government, thereby enabling the government to seek a new indictment if 
it so chose.71   
Over the next decade, O’Bryan tried to sue Judge Chandler for 
defamation, and in one instance he won an award of damages in state court 
that was later overturned.72  The New York Times covered this lawsuit.73  All 
the while, O’Bryan remained a disbarred attorney.74   
One of the few judicial impediments to arise from this issue occurred in 
1965, when Judge Chandler refused to disqualify himself from a contested 
case between Texaco Oil and an Oklahoma corporation.75  The local 
attorney who defended Judge Chandler in state court against O’Bryan’s libel 
claim also represented the Oklahoma based corporation, and 
Judge Chandler refused to transfer the case to another judge.76  In response 
 
66. Id. 
67. Id.   
68. Id. at 222.   
69. Id. at 223.   
70. Cf. id. (“The action infuriated Chandler.”). 
71. Id. 
72. West, supra note 11, at 9.   
73. See Judge Loses in Libel Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1967, at 72 (reporting on disbarred attorney 
W.H. Pat O’Bryan’s suit against Judge Chandler). 
74. See THE BENCHWARMERS, supra note 52, at 221–22 (outlining how O’Bryan was disbarred 
in the federal courts and later also disbarred in the state courts).   
75. See Texaco v. Chandler, 354 F.2d 655, 656 (10th Cir. 1965) (detailing Judge Chandler’s 
refusal to disqualify himself from the Texaco suit in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 455). 
76. See id. (explaining Judge Chandler’s connection to attorney John M. Cantrell). 
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to Texaco’s appeals, the Tenth Circuit issued a writ of mandamus and 
disqualified Judge Chandler from the trial.77 
Another aspect of judicial conduct highlighted in Goulden’s book had to 
do with Judge Chandler’s visible animus towards Armand Hammer and 
Occidental Petroleum.78  Hammer, a wealthy oil magnate, owned a large 
portion of Parker Petroleum, an Oklahoma-based oil corporation.  In 1962, 
he tried to reorganize Parker Petroleum.79  Judge Chandler was assigned 
this case pursuant to the district court’s case assignment rules.80  In turn, 
Judge Bohanon objected to Judge Chandler’s appointment, but to no 
avail.81  Judge Chandler held a number of ex-parte hearings—without the 
presence of Hammer or Occidental—in which he cast aspersions on 
them.82  The hearings were transcribed, yet Judge Chandler refused to 
provide them to any party—even directing the transcriptionist not to turn 
them over until the Tenth Circuit ordered him to produce them.83  This led 
the Tenth Circuit to disqualify Judge Chandler from the Parker Petroleum 
reorganization case.84  Again, following disqualification, Judge Chandler 
filed an interlocutory appeal and a writ of mandamus.85 
Finally, in April of 1965, a state district attorney secured an indictment 
against Judge Chandler for defrauding the state of its tax revenues.86  The 
indictment alleged that Judge Chandler had pressured the state to build 
 
77. See id. at 657 (finding inapposite Judge Chandler, and holding he could no longer proceed 
in the Texaco case). 
78. See THE BENCHWARMERS, supra note 52, at 226 (“Chandler said he felt Hammer was trying 
to ‘choke his company to death . . . so that they can milk it . . . .  I intend to say that from the bench 
because I verily believe it to be true.’” (citation omitted)). 
79. See id. at 224 (examining the plan to reorganize Parker Petroleum set forth by Dr. Armand 
Hammer of Occidental Petroleum). 
80. See id. (showing Judge Chandler began presiding over the Occidental case after Judge Wallace’s 
death). 
81. See id. at 225 (“Bohanon was arguing with [Judge] Chandler that bankruptcy and other 
reorganization cases should be split equitably among the four judges of the Western District.”).   
82. Id. at 226.   
83. Id. at 227. 
84. Id. at 229; see also Occidental Petroleum v. Chandler, 303 F.2d 55, 57 (10th Cir. 1962) (“It is 
therefore ordered that the Honorable Stephen S. Chandler, respondent herein, shall proceed no further 
in the matter of Parker Petroleum Co. . . . .”). 
85. Cf. THE BENCHWARMERS, supra note 52, at 232 (attempting to overturn the judgement, 
Judge Chandler spent several years filing appeals and unsuccessfully tried to have the Order reversed 
by the Supreme Court). 
86. See Preliminary Information, Oklahoma v. Chandler (1965) (on file with the Library of 
Congress) (indicting Judge Chandler for conspiring to defraud the State of Oklahoma). 
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roads into the Smiling Hills development at the taxpayers’ expense.87  
Claiming judicial immunity, Judge Chandler refused to appear at his own 
arraignment and then filed disbarment actions against the district attorney.88  
On November 3, 1965, the state’s major newspaper, the Daily Oklahoman, 
reported on its front page that a state grand jury had summoned 
Judge Chandler to testify.89  The next day, the newspaper reported 
Judge Chandler’s attorneys’ statement that the grand jury lacked authority 
to issue the subpoena.90  Not even a week later, the Daily Oklahoman 
headlined its front page with “Grand Jury Indicts Chandler.”91  Ultimately, 
a state trial judge dismissed the indictment after learning that the contested 
roads existed prior to Smiling Hills being contemplated.92  Although 
Judge Chandler had not broken any state laws, his dismissiveness of the 
State’s legal system brought his judicial abilities into further question.93  
There are other aspects of Judge Chandler’s personality, judicial actions, 
and extra-judicial activities that Goulden did not cover, but are still pertinent 
to the legislative investigation of him, as well as to the process of his judicial 
appeals.  In 1962, Harlan Grimes, an Oklahoma attorney, complained to 
Congressman Celler that Judge Chandler had received payoffs from parties 
appearing in his court, and for two years, Grimes pressed 
Congressman Celler to take action against Judge Chandler.94  In 1964, 
 
87. See id. (alleging Judge Chandler conspired to use material belonging to Oklahoma County to 
construct a private road); see also THE BENCHWARMERS, supra note 52, at 236 (referring to the criminal 
case against Judge Chandler).   
88. THE BENCHWARMERS, supra note 52, at 236. 
89. Grand Jurors Call Chandler, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 3, 1965, at 1.   
90. Mary Goddard, Chandler’s Challenge of Subpoena Denied, Jury Date Up in Air, DAILY 
OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 4, 1965, at 1 [hereinafter Goddard, Chandler’s Challenge]; Mary Goddard, Chandler’s 
Date with Jury Remains Up in Air, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 4, 1965, at 1. 
91. Katherine Hatch, Grand Jury Indicts Chandler, Kessler, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 10, 1965, 
at 1. 
92. See THE BENCHWARMERS, supra note 52, at 236 (asserting Judge Chandler’s exoneration 
ultimately occurred because “the county had owned the roads since 1957”); West, supra note 11, at 10 
(“The indictment was quashed when an Oklahoma State judge found the evidence presented to the 
grand jury was insufficient to show that a crime had been committed.”).   
93. See Goddard, Chandler’s Challenge, supra note 90 (advancing Judge Chandler’s opposition of 
the state legal system through his attorneys’ assertion that the grand jury had no authority to indict 
him).   
94. Letter from Jack Brooks, U.S. Representative, to Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House 
Judiciary Comm. (July 6, 1962) (on file with the Library of Congress).  Congressman Brooks, in his 
response to Congressman Celler, indicated that neither congressman had any knowledge of Grimes or 
Judge Chandler.  Id.  Specifically, Brooks wrote: 
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Grimes insisted to Congressman Celler that he had evidence 
Judge Chandler pressure a party to deed property to his daughter for a 
significant reduction in price over the property’s value.95  By this time, 
Grimes had gained notoriety for exposing corruption, particularly bribes, in 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court.96  Grimes uncovered that three state justices 
had accepted payoffs in exchange for issuing favorable decisions.97  The 
press covered Chief Judge N.S. Corn’s acceptance of over $150,000 in 
payoffs,98 and the Daily Oklahoman attempted to link Judge Chandler with 
Chief Judge Corn.99  However, there was no link between the state justices 
and Judge Chandler, and, in fact, there was evidence that Judge Chandler 
had independently accused the state supreme court justice of corruption.100   
 
I received your inquiry concerning a letter from Mr. Harlan Grimes of Dallas concerning 
information he has received in regard to a member of the Federal Judiciary. 
I have not heard any reports along the lines that Mr. Grimes relates in his letter . . . .  And as a 
matter of fact, I don’t believe I have ever heard of this particular charge before. 
Id.  Congressman Celler responded, “May I suggest that you make some very discreet inquiries 
concerning the conduct of the charge and let me know what, if anything, you have found.”  Letter 
from Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm., to Jack Brooks, U.S. Representative 
(Feb. 23, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress).   
95. Letter from Harlan Grimes, to Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm. 
(June 1, 1964) (on file with the Library of Congress).  Grimes claimed: 
[I]n June 1956, when Judge Chandler walked into his, Abbott’s office, laid a deed form with ten-
dollar check attached on his desk and informed Mr. Abbott that he, Chandler, was going to give 
him, Abbott, five thousand dollars for an acre of land that had a market value of at least fifteen 
thousand dollars at the time, that [Judge] Chandler told Abbott[,] “You are in trouble and I am 
going to help you[.]” 
Id. 
96. See State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Grimes, 436 P.2d 40, 43 (Okla. 1967) (“The complaint 
charged [Grimes] with making three separate false charges of bribery against various members of this 
Court.”).   
97. See, e.g., In re Grimes, 364 F.2d 654, 655–56 (10th Cir. 1966) (explaining how the Oklahoma 
Bar association commenced disbarment proceedings against Grimes after he had publicly accused 
“members of the Supreme Court of the state of Oklahoma with having received a bribe for the 
rendering of an opinion”).  In 1949, Grimes published a pamphlet claiming that several judges in 
Oklahoma were corrupt.  Id. 
98. Scandal Shakes Oklahoma Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1964, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1964/07/19/scandal-shakes-oklahoma-court.html [perma.cc/3JR2-
UKZH]. 
99. See Tarred with Same Brush, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, July 3, 1964, at 12 (“For the integrity of 
the whole court is affected as matters stand.”).   
100. Cf. West, supra note 11, at 6–8 (showing Judge Chandler’s actions in relation to Judge 
Corn’s behavior).   
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Like O’Bryan, Grimes professionally suffered as a result of his allegations 
against Judge Chandler.  In 1959, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ordered 
Grimes be disbarred from the practice of law after he first alleged that the 
state justices had accepted bribes.101  In spite of Judge Chandler’s 
innocence in regard to the state corruption, Grimes’ accusation was 
recognized and taken into consideration by the Council when it investigated 
Judge Chandler.102 
B. The Legislative Purpose of the Judicial Council 
Even with the notoriety of Judge Chandler’s conduct, failure of both the 
House Judiciary Committee and Congress to seek an impeachment against 
him was reasonable.  There was no clear evidence that Judge Chandler had 
accepted bribes.103  He appeared, at worst, to lack judgment and was overly 
irascible toward litigants.104  Questions arising from judicial impartiality and 
temperament are generally matters for appeal only, and in the absence of 
evidence of corruption, judicial irascibility—a trait complained of 
throughout the history of the Republic—is not a basis for impeachment.105   
On the other hand, there was an apparent need for some amount of 
judicial supervision over Judge Chandler, given his demeanor, if not his 
obstinacy in refusing to recuse himself.  Whether the law enabled such 
supervision was a matter of interpretation.  Under the law, a chief justice 
could have exercised supervisory authority to assign Judge Chandler cases, 
or to temporarily add federal judges to Judge Chandler’s district so as to 
 
101. See In re Application of Grimes for Reinstatement to the Practice of Law, 494 P.2d 635, 
637 (Okla. 1971) (denying Grimes’ application for reinstatement into the Oklahoma state bar after 
being disbarred in May of 1960, and detailing Grimes’ accusations against the justices). 
102. Cf. West, supra note 11, at 10 (“[Judge Chandler’s] travails were a regular feature in the local 
newspapers and they were an unending source of frustration and embarrassment to the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.  Inexorably, they led to a showdown with the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council.”). 
103. But cf. id. at 7 (implying Judge Chandler was fearful an “outraged public might demand 
wholesale reform” of judicial conduct in light of Judge Corn’s sworn statement admitting to accepting 
bribes). 
104. See id. at 5 (detailing an order removing Judge Chandler from a case because of his 
“personal enmity, hostility, bias and prejudice against [the litigant party]”).   
105. Cf. Timothy S. Huebner, Emory Speer and Federal Enforcement of the Rights of African Americans, 
55 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 34, 61–62 (2015) (assigning a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee 
to investigate the unseemly behavior of Judge Emory Speer, and finding “the inconclusive nature of 
most of the testimony forced the subcommittee to forego impeachment”).  Judge Emory Speer, an 
aged Civil War veteran appointed by President Chester Arthur, was accused of intemperate conduct 
while on the bench.  Id. at 61.  However, no vote was taken to impeach, and he continued in his judicial 
duties until his death in 1918.  Id. at 62–63.   
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minimize Judge Chandler’s case load.106  Congress passed the law 
establishing this in 1922, and upon recommendation of President William 
H. Taft, also established the Judicial Conference of the United States.107  
The 1922 Act enabled the United States Supreme Court Chief Justice to call 
an annual conference of the senior appellate judges to propose legislation to 
Congress regarding the administration of the judiciary—in addition to 
authorizing the Chief Justice to temporarily reassign district court judges to 
districts that were inundated with large numbers of trials.108  The 1922 Act 
was a predecessor to the establishment of judicial councils.109 
In 1939, Congress passed an act known as the Administrative Office Act, 
empowering the federal judiciary to regulate itself.110  This was partly the 
result of a judicial assertion against President Franklin Roosevelt’s “court-
packing” plan.111  The part of the 1939 Act which is now codified as 
28 U.S.C. §§ 601–10 created the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts.112  In a sense, the 1939 Act was an expansion of the 1922 Act; the 
composition of the Conference created by the 1922 Act remained the same, 
although, the 1939 Act expanded its duties and authority.113  The 1922 Act 
required the United States Supreme Court Chief Justice to annually convene 
 
106. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012) (codifying section 2 of chapter 306 of Pub. L. No. 67-298, and 
establishing the Conference of Circuit Judges of the United States). 
107. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-298, ch. 306, 42 Stat. 837 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 
(2012)); PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 30–31 
(1973). 
108. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, 42 Stat. at 838–39; see also J. Clifford Wallace, Must We Have 
the Nunn Bill? The Alternative of Judicial Councils of the Circuits, 51 IND. L.J. 297, 311–12 (1976) (explaining 
the creation and purpose of the Judicial Conference). 
109. Cf. FISH, supra note 107, at 30–31 (portraying the Act as a seed spawned by President Taft 
with the intent to develop the Act into a reform of “inferior federal courts”). 
110. Administrative Office Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 601–10 (2012)); see Fish, supra note 18, at 203–06 (describing the Act of 1939, which 
provided the Federal Judiciary with a complete administrative system in both the United States Judicial 
Conference and the federal judicial councils).  Congress acted in concert with the advice of Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes, along with Chief Judges John J. Parker of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit, and Duncan Groener of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.  Id. at 205–08; 
accord JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 114 (Boston, 
Little, Brown & Co. 1950) (discussing the Act of 1939).  
111. Fish, supra note 19, at 205–06. 
112. Administrative Office Act, § 302, 53 Stat. at 1223. 
113. Compare Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, 42 Stat. at 838 (establishing the Conference of 
Circuit Judges of the United States), with Administrative Office Act of 1939, § 302–305, 53 Stat. 
at 1223–24 (amending the 1922 Act, and adding to the Conference’s duties and authority associated 
with the AO). 
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a meeting of the chief judges of the courts of appeals.114  The meeting, 
titled “Judicial Conference of the United States,” was charged with the duty 
of compiling statistics on matters such as the individual case-loads of the 
district courts, judicial finances, the need to create new judgeships, and the 
requirement to temporarily transfer district court judges to districts 
experiencing an increase in the number of trials.115  The 1922 Act 
empowered the United States Supreme Court Chief Justice to summon the 
Attorney General of the United States to report on the numbers and types 
of cases to which the United States was a party, as well as provide the 
Attorney General a means for bringing complaints against judges.116  The 
Conference was also tasked with the duty of providing an annual report to 
Congress for the purpose of evaluating the need to create new judicial 
positions or increase fiscal expenditures for the judiciary.117  Today, the 
Judicial Conference is the pinnacle of the internal hierarchy for assessing 
federal judicial policies and rules, as well as examining judicial conduct.118   
In 1966, the New York Times informed its readers that the Conference was 
in the process of weighing proposals for the removal of unfit judges, and 
noted that Judge Chandler was one of the reasons for this effort.119 
 
114. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, 42 Stat. at 838. 
115. The 1922 Act specifically required:  
Said conference shall make a comprehensive survey of the condition of business in the courts of 
the United States and prepare plans for assignment and transfer of judges to or from circuits or 
districts where the state of the docket or condition of business indicates the need therefor, and 
shall submit such suggestions to the various courts as may seem in the interest of uniformity and 
expedition of business. 
See id.  In 1948, the Judicial Code renamed the Conference of Circuit Judges of the United States to 
the Judicial Conference of the United States.  See Judicial Code of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, ch. 646, 
62 Stat. 902, 902 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012)).  
116. Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, 42 Stat. at 839 (“The Attorney General shall, upon request 
of the Chief Justice, report to said conference on matters relating to the business of the several courts 
of the United States, with particular reference to causes or proceedings in which the United States may 
be a party.”).  
117. Id. at 838 (requiring circuit court judges to provide information regarding the caseload in 
their docket, and recommendations for additional “judicial assistance” for the disposal of their 
caseload, which will in turn be converted into a survey). 
118. Cf. RULES FOR JUD. CONDUCT & JUD. DISABILITY PROC. § 320, r. 2 cmt. (JUD. CONF. 
U.S. 2015) [hereinafter RULES FOR JUD. CONDUCT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-
judgeships/judicial-conduct-disability [perma.cc/L7X9-ZV2Q] (providing “nationally uniform 
provisions” governing judicial misconduct and ethics). 
119. U.S. Judges Weigh Proposals for Removal of Unfit Jurists, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1966, at 31. 
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The part of the 1939 Act that is now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 332 created 
a system of judicial councils within each circuit in an effort to make trials 
more efficient.120  In this, Congress empowered each circuit court of 
appeals to curtail an administrative mechanism for court governance.121  
Today, under 28 U.S.C § 332, each circuit has a council, “consisting of the 
chief judge of the circuit . . . and an equal number of circuit judges and 
district judges of the circuit.”122  In 1939, no appellate judge—except for 
those on senior status—was exempt from serving on a council.123  One of 
the administrative aspects of a council was that it could allocate trials to 
judges in the district courts containing more than one district court judge, 
particularly in instances when the district court judges were unable to agree 
upon the assignment of cases.124  Congress’ purpose in empowering a 
judicial council to assign cases in an administrative capacity, rather than a 
circuit court doing so in a judicial capacity, was to preserve litigants their 
right to move a trial judge for recusal.125  In 1948, Congress amended this 
part of the 1939 Act to enable the councils to “freeze” an overburdened 
judge’s caseload until the case “backload” was alleviated.126  In 1976, John 
 
120. Administrative Office Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, §§ 306–07, 53 Stat. 1223, 1223–24 
(codified as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 332 (2012));  see also WOLF HEYDERBRAND & CARROLL SERON, 
RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 37 
(1990) (explaining the establishment of the judicial councils and their purpose).   
121. Administrative Office Act of 1939, § 306–07, 53 Stat. at 1223–24. 
122. 28 U.S.C. § 332 (2012). 
123. Administrative Office Act of 1939, § 307, 53 Stat. at 1223–24 (“A conference shall be 
held . . . which conference shall be composed of circuit and district judges in such circuit who reside 
within the continental United States, with participation in such conference on the part of members of 
the bar under rules to be prescribed by the circuit court . . . .”). 
124. Notably the 1939 Act stated:  
The senior judge shall submit to the council the quarterly reports of the Director required to be 
filed by the provisions of section 304, clause (2), and such action shall be taken thereon by the 
council as may be necessary.  It shall be the duty of the district judges promptly to carry out the 
directions of the council as to the administration of the business of their respective courts.  
Nothing contained in this section shall affect the provisions of existing law relating to the 
assignment of district judges to serve outside of the districts for which they, respectively, were 
appointed. 
Id. at § 306, 53 Stat. at 1224.  Cf. Fish, supra note 19, at 207 (“Although wide agreement existed on the 
scope of the councils’ powers, judges differed over the manner of exercising this power and over the 
degree of permitted coercion.”).   
125. Cf. Fish, supra note 19, at 208 (suggesting one argument for a multi-judge council is to 
promote “greater confidence on the part of the bar and public”).  
126. Judicial Code of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 902, 902 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 332 (2012)) (“Each judicial council shall make all necessary orders for the effective and expeditious 
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Clifford Wallace, a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
opined that 28 U.S.C. § 332 was “a broad grant of power” to the courts of 
appeals.127  However, as the Ninth Circuit noted in 1980, a judicial council’s 
rules do not provide an additional means for appeal.128   
To fully place the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit’s conduct 
concerning Judge Chandler into perspective, a third act requires mention; 
Congress never directly delegated authority to the courts of appeals to 
determine judicial case assignments.  Under 28 U.S.C. § 137, districts, 
containing more than one district court judge, are to allocate their case-loads 
according to local district court rules.129  These rules are proposed by the 
chief district court judge and agreed upon by a majority of judges within the 
district to ensure an equitable distribution of cases.130  However, in 
 
administration of the business of the courts within its circuit.  The district judges shall promptly carry 
into effect all orders of the judicial council.”); accord MARY L. VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENT: 
NONE CALLED FOR JUSTICE 10 (1993) (arguing the 1939 Act provided councils the authority to 
“freeze judges’ caseloads until backlogs were cleared, assign judges to virtually nonexistent jurisdictions, 
and certify judges’ physical and mental disability”). 
127. See Wallace, supra note 108, at 312–13 (“There seems to be little doubt that Congress 
intended a broad grant of power under section 332(d).”).  It is noteworthy that Judge Wallace also 
acknowledged that there was a disagreement over the nature of the council’s powers.  He penned: 
Some view the councils as purely administrative bodies without any judicial powers whose role is 
to deal with the problems of administering the courts.  Others see the councils as a body with 
certain judicial powers, including the power to determine the fitness of a judge to hear cases.  The 
legislative history is subject to both interpretations.  But it should be noted that the creation of 
the councils was part of an Act, the overall purpose of which was to speed the administration of 
justice. 
Id. at 313. 
128. See In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 613 F.2d 768, 769 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The Procedures 
are not intended to provide an alternative avenue for appealing a judge’s rulings in a particular case.”).  
This decision arose from a suit brought by inmates housed in the Arizona state penal system.  Id.  The 
inmates sought habeas review (“administrative remedies”) from the district court.  Id.  When the district 
court did not grant a review, the inmate petitioners alleged the judge was biased and that recusal was 
required.  Id.  However, they alleged this claim to the Council.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit held that 
administrative remedies were not available as a substitute for judicial remedies, and, because there was 
a mechanism for the disqualification of judges, the inmate petitioners could not seek redress through 
the Council.  Id.   
129. See 28 U.S.C. § 137 (1976) (“The business of a court having more than one judge shall be 
divided among the judges . . . .”). 
130. See id. (explaining the role district court judges have in managing case-loads).  This section 
reads in its entirety: 
The business of a court having more than one judge shall be divided among the judges as provided 
by the rules and orders of the court.  The chief judge of the district court shall be responsible for 
the observance of such rules and orders, and shall divide the business and assign the cases so far 
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instances where the district court judges are unable to agree to the division 
of cases (or the adoption of case allocation rules), the judicial councils 
possess the authority to “make necessary orders” for case distribution.131  
This system is designed to enable administrative oversight over the district 
courts without impinging on their independence.132  In theory, as long as 
the district court judges agree to the division of cases (and as long as the 
case assignment rules do not enable litigants to obtain a judge of their 
choice), a judicial council possesses no authority to encroach into district 
court administration.133   
Judge Chandler became Chief Judge of the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Oklahoma in 1956,134 and as Chief Judge, he 
inherited a scheme for the distribution of cases from the previous chief 
under 28 U.S.C. § 137—by “secret lot.”135  He did not alter this 
arrangement, and the other judges of Oklahoma’s Western District agreed 
with the case assignment scheme, thus, it was consistent with 28 U.S.C. 
§ 137.136  Assuming the 28 U.S.C. § 137 “secret lot” system was designed 
to prevent forum shopping by litigants, it is important to note that there is 
no evidence that any judge in the Western District of Oklahoma opposed 
this system.   
Prior to Chandler I and II, the United States Supreme Court had not 
addressed 28 U.S.C. § 137, or §§ 331–32.137  In 1964, the D.C. Circuit Court 
 
as such rules and orders do not otherwise prescribe.  If the district judges in any district are unable 
to agree upon the adoption of rules or orders for that purpose the judicial council of the circuit 
shall make the necessary orders. 
Id.   
131. Id. 
132. Cf. Fish, supra note 19, at 222 (asserting the absence of subpoena powers make it difficult 
for a judicial council to interfere with relations between litigants and judges, and implying that necessity 
of such intervention is evidently necessary). 
133. See, e.g., Fish, supra note 19, at 216–17 (“Circuit councils have been formally designated as 
arbiters of disagreements over administrative policies in the lower courts.”). 
134. U.S. Judge Stephen Chandler, 89; Often Feuded with His Colleagues, supra note 22. 
135. See Stanley, Jr. & Russell, supra note 25, at 136 (discussing the Order requesting a stay of 
Judge Chandler’s inherited cases).  
136. See id. at 137 (“If the judges of a district court are unable to agree upon rules and orders 
for dividing the workload among them, then by statute, the circuit councils must issue the needed 
orders.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 137)). 
137. See generally Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 75–76 (addressing the “scope and constitutionality of 
the powers of the Judicial Councils under 28 U.S.C. §§ 137 and 332[,]” and proclaiming the issues as 
questions of first impression). 
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of Appeals held in Washington v. Clemmer,138 a per curiam decision, that a 
judge possessed the administrative authority to order a grand jury 
commissioner to supply a stenographer for a preliminary hearing convened 
to determine whether a defendant could be held in confinement pending a 
grand jury.139  In Washington, however, the commissioner not only refused 
to order a stenographer for the preliminary hearing, but he also refused to 
issue subpoenas to potential alibi witnesses that could have altered the grand 
jury’s decision on the indictment.140  After the district court judge 
erroneously ruled that he lacked the authority to issue a habeas writ or to 
order the commissioner to supply the stenographer and issue subpoenas, 
the appellate court vacated the district court’s ruling, ordering the judge to 
abide by his authority to force the commissioner to comply with the 
fundamental fairness requirements of due process.141  In his dissent, Judge 
John Anthony Danaher argued that the majority’s order to the defendant 
was administrative in nature and should have been resolved through the 
circuit’s judicial council under 28 U.S.C. § 332 rather than through the 
formal habeas writ.142 
In 1957, the Supreme Court, in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co.,143—a 
decision Justice Harlan cited to explain his concurrence in Chandler—held 
that courts of appeals possessed the discretionary authority to issue writs of 
mandamus to compel a district court to proceed to trial.144  Leading up to 
that decision, District Court Judge Walter A. La Buy (a Franklin Roosevelt 
appointee) had become flustered with a large number of plaintiffs and 
defendants in two civil anti-trust cases involving allegations of monopolistic 
price fixing in the production and sale of shoe repair items.145  Instead of 
 
138. Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per curiam). 
139. See id. at 717–18 (granting a judge the right to order a stenographer during a preliminary 
hearing on behalf of a defendant). 
140. Id. at 716, 718. 
141. See id. at 718 (“We are sure that the Commissioner and the District Court will have no 
difficulty in providing a procedure for the formal approval of indigent subpoenas by a judge which 
Rule 17(b) seems to require.”). 
142. See id. at 722–23 (Danaher, J., dissenting) (“28 U.S.C. § 332 (1958) authorizes the Judicial 
Council composed of all the active judges of the circuit to ‘make all necessary orders for the effective 
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within its circuit.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 332 (1958))). 
143. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957). 
144. See id. at 259–60 (holding the court of appeals may exert control over district courts in 
order to administer the federal judicial system).   
145. See id. at 252 (showcasing how “[t]he record indicates that the cases had been burdensome 
to the petitioner”). 
 2017] The Right to an Independent Judiciary 113 
continuing with the two cases, Judge La Buy consolidated them and then 
transferred them to a special master.146  With the consent of the parties, a 
special master could be appointed to determine contested interlocutory 
matters as well as shepherd the parties into a settlement.147  However, none 
of the parties consented to Judge La Buy’s transfer of duties.  Instead, they 
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.148  The Seventh 
Circuit issued a writ of mandamus and ordered Judge La Buy to proceed 
with the case.149  In response, Judge La Buy appealed to the Supreme Court, 
which held that a federal appellate court could—within its judicial 
function—exercise supervisory authority over its district courts.150  Justice 
William Brennan, joined by Justices Felix Frankfurter, Harold Burton, and 
John Marshall Harlan, dissented from the decision on the basis that 
Judge La Buy’s action did not create an exceptional circumstance under the 
All Writs Act to justify the issuance of the writ of mandamus.151  The 
dissenters also urged that the Court’s decision would enable appellate court 
intrusions into trial processes under a theory that any matter which might 
later arise in an appeal could be appealable during a trial.152  If this occurred, 
the Justices cautioned, trials could last for years.153   
 
146. Id. 
147. See id. at 266 (“The references to the master were made under the authority of Rule 53(b) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 
148. See generally Howes Leather Co. v. La Buy, 226 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1955) (manifesting the 
parties’ appeal to the Seventh Circuit in light of La Buy’s transfer to a special master).   
149. Id. at 706.   
150. See La Buy, 352 U.S. at 259–60 (“We believe that supervisory control of the District Courts 
by the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial administration in the federal system.”). 
151. See id. at 260 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I do not agree that the writ directing Judge La Buy 
to vacate the order of reference was within the bounds of the discretionary power of the Court of 
Appeals to issue extraordinary writ under the All Writs Act.”). 
152. See id. at 263 (“What this Court is saying, therefore, is that the All Writs Act confers an 
independent appellate power in the Courts of Appeals to review interlocutory orders.  I have always 
understood the law to be precisely to the contrary.”).   
153. See id. at 267–68 (“That standard allows interlocutory appeals by leave of the appellate 
court.  The federal policy of limited interlocutory review stresses the inconvenience and expense of 
piecemeal reviews and the strong public interest in favor of a single and complete trial with a single 
and complete review.”).  The dissent goes on to say,  
I protest, not only because we invade a domain reserved by the Constitution exclusively to the 
Congress, but as well because the encouragement to interlocutory appeals offered by this decision 
must necessarily aggravate further the already bad condition of calendar congestion in some of 
our District Courts and also add to the burden of work of some of our busiest Courts of Appeals.  
More petitions for interlocutory review, requiring the attention of the Courts of Appeals, add, of 
course, to the burden of work of those courts. 
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La Buy did not arise from facts similar to those at issue in the Supreme 
Court’s Chandler I opinion, and the Seventh Circuit’s use of the mandamus 
writ required it only to comply with a set legal standard for interlocutory 
appeals granted in federal court.154  In Chandler I, there was no legal 
standard employed by the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, that is, the 
Council never determined the issues before it under a preponderance of the 
evidence—or any other articulated standard.155  On the other hand, one 
might presume that Justice Brennan’s action in dissenting in La Buy may 
have forced him to join with the majority in Chandler I.  In an early draft of 
his La Buy dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the Seventh Circuit had an 
obligation through its Judicial Council to conduct an “efficient, business-
like calendar,” and it should have used the Council—rather than expand the 
narrow mandamus legal doctrine—to order Judge La Buy to proceed.156 
C. The Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit and Judge Chandler 
On January 21, 1966, the Supreme Court refused to issue a stay against 
the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council from acting against Judge Chandler.157  
This date (aside from its obvious importance as a date of issuance) puts the 
rapidity of the Council’s actions into context.  The Court, for reasons noted 
below, appeared to have been confused as to how to address 
Judge Chandler’s appeal, for at no time did the investigating judges of the 
Council explain why they could impartially review Judge Chandler’s 
actions.158   
Understanding the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s composition 
is important to contextualize its actions.  Alfred Murrah served as the Chief 
Judge of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals (President Roosevelt appointed 
 
Id. at 268 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).   
154. La Buy, 352 U.S. at 249.   
155. Cf. Chandler I, 382 U.S. at 1003 (Black, J., dissenting) (“The reason given by the Council for 
this drastic action is that it ‘finds that Judge Chandler is presently unable, or unwilling to discharge 
efficiently the duties of his office.’”).   
156. See William Brennan, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Unpublished Draft Dissent (Dec. 17, 
1956), in La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) (on file with the Library of Congress) 
(explaining 28 U.S.C. § 332 grants the Seventh Circuit the authority to use its Judicial Council to carry 
out administrative functions of the court).  This language did not make it into the published dissent 
after Justice Frankfurter advised against it.  Letter from Felix Frankfurter, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, 
to William Brennan, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (1956) (on file with the Library of Congress).   
157. Chandler I, 382 U.S. at 1003.   
158. Cf. id. at 1003 (Black, J., dissenting) (“The reason given by the Council for this drastic 
action is that it ‘finds that Judge Chandler is presently unable, or unwilling to discharge efficiently the 
duties of his office.’”).   
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him in 1940) but, from 1937 through 1940, Judge Murrah was a United 
States District Court Judge for the Western District of Oklahoma.159  When 
Judge Murrah left to serve for the Tenth Circuit, Roosevelt appointed 
Judge Chandler to replace him in Oklahoma’s Western District.160  Thus, 
the Tenth Circuit members were Judge David T. Lewis, Judge Jean 
S. Breitenstein, Judge Delmas C. Hill, Judge Oliver Seth, and 
Judge Murrah.161  President Dwight David Eisenhower appointed 
Judge Lewis and Judge Breitenstein, while Judge Hill and Judge Seth were 
both appointed by President John F. Kennedy.162  In 1964, Judge Chandler 
criticized the entire Tenth Circuit—and singled out Judge Murrah—in a 
speech.163  Judge Murrah recused himself from voting in the Judicial 
Council on any matters involving Judge Chandler.164  Judge Murrah also 
disqualified himself from appointing any district court judges to replace 
Judge Chandler on pending cases.165  Because Judge Chandler attacked 
Judge Murrah’s credibility in a public forum, it might have been required 
that a different judicial council examine Judge Chandler’s conduct, yet no 
statutory mechanism existed to force this issue.166 
On December 13, 1965, the Judicial Council held a secret meeting, 
excluding Judge Chandler, and then issued an Order effectively stripping 
 
159. See GREAT AMERICAN JUDGES AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, VOL. II, L–Z 564 (John R. Vile ed., 
2003) (outlining Murrah’s route to appointment).   
160. See id. at 564, 569 (detailing Murrah’s rise to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and his 
disagreements with Judge Chandler).  Vile wrote that Murrah, despite being a talented jurist, was 
ineffective in handling his dispute with Judge Chandler.  Id.   
161. Order from the Special Session of the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S. 
at 1, Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 382 U.S. 1004 (1966) (No. 1111, 
Misc.) [hereinafter Order No. 1111] (on file with the Library of Congress). 
162. Judges of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, TENTH CIR. HIST. SOC’Y, 
http://www.10thcircuithistory.org/list-tenth-circuit-judges [perma.cc/D93F-EK7E] (listing judges on 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the president who appointed each judge). 
163. Cf. Terence Kern, Judge Alfred P. Murrah—A Vision of Things, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 
737, 752 (2004) (mentioning Judge Chandler and Murrah had several conflicting issues, and 
highlighting Judge Chandler’s public criticism of Murrah).   
164. See Order No. 1111, supra note 161, at 1–2 (noting Murrah’s absence in a proceeding 
related to Judge Chandler).   
165. Letter from John F. Davis, Clerk, U.S. Supreme Court, to Byron White, Justice, U.S. 
Supreme Court (Feb. 3, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress) (reporting Judge Murrah 
disqualified himself from the O’Bryan v. Chandler case, and that he wrote to Judge Lewis suggesting 
Judge Lewis act in the matter). 
166. See Order No. 1111, supra note 161, at 2 (“The Council noted the reference by the Supreme 
Court to the statement in the response of the Solicitor General that the Council contemplated further 
proceedings and the order of the Supreme Court that the application for stay be denied ‘pending this 
contemplated prompt action of the Judicial Council.’” (citation omitted)).   
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him of his judicial powers by barring him from serving on cases.167  The 
secret meeting—even if administrative—would have violated the 
constitutional principles of notice and opportunity to be heard, unless, 
perhaps, it could be determined that Judge Chandler had no substantial 
interest in the outcome.168  While it was true that the December 13 Order 
did not cost Judge Chandler his income, his ability to function as an 
Article III judge with full constitutional protections certainly was 
affected.169  Additionally, the Council’s December 13 Order declared that 
because Judge Chandler was “unable or unwilling to discharge efficiently 
[his] duties . . .” he could no longer be assigned to cases.170  But there was 
no proof of this charge, and the findings of the Council did not include any 
standards of proof or evidence to sustain it.171 
On January 21, 1966, Judge Chandler appealed to Justice Byron White to 
stay the Council’s December 13 Order.172  Justice White did not grant the 
Stay on the basis that Judge Chandler’s appeal was “interlocutory in 
character” and therefore not ripe for a grant of review.173  Although 
Justice White issued the denial of a stay on January 21, initially it was Chief 
Justice Warren who authored the draft denial, assuming that since he was 
Chief Justice and head of the Judicial Conference, the duty fell to him.174  
Chief Justice Warren’s draft simply held that the Court would not consider 
interlocutory appeals from administrative acts.175  However, Justice Harlan 
objected to Chief Justice Warren’s terse, single-sentence denial.176   
 
167. See id. (mentioning the December 13 meeting).   
168. See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (establishing required procedures to 
deprive a person of substantial rights).   
169. See Order No. 1111, supra note 161, at 2 (suggesting Judge Chandler appear before the 
Judicial Council for a hearing to determine whether he would continue to preside over cases).   
170. Chandler I, 382 U.S. 1003, 1003 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).   
171. See id. (majority opinion) (failing to discuss the proof of the charge against Judge Chandler, 
or to adopt a standard by which to evaluate the Judicial Council’s charge); Order No. 1111, supra 
note 161, at 2 (defining the Judicial Council’s findings without an analysis under an appropriate 
standard). 
172. See Chandler I, 382 U.S. at 1003 (discussing Judge Chandler’s appeal to stay the Council’s 
Order). 
173. See id. at 1003–04 (noting a final judgment was to be rendered before the decision could 
be appealed to the Supreme Court). 
174. Memorandum from Earl Warren, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Conference 
(Jan. 19, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress) (discussing his prior draft denial). 
175. Id. 
176. See Letter from Jane to Byron White, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 20, 1966) (on file 
with the Library of Congress) (noting Justice Harlan had concerns over the draft denial and requested 
further discussion with Justice White).   
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Because Chief Justice Warren, at the time, was in Missouri on holiday, he 
asked Justice Fortas to improve on the draft denial.177  This time, Justice 
Fortas expanded on the denial, but once more rested it on the basis that 
Judge Chandler’s motion was an “entirely interlocutory matter.”178  
Justice White disagreed with Justice Fortas, and countered that it was 
necessary to acknowledge that at a future date—and based on the Judicial 
Council’s future actions—Judge Chandler could have a basis for a 
motion.179  Likely because Justice White was responsible for the Tenth 
Circuit Judicial Council, he authored the Court’s published Order denying 
Judge Chandler a stay of the December 13 Order.180   
At the same time, Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall informed the 
Court that the Council had notified Judge Chandler that after he exhausted 
his docket, he could apply to the Council and certify that he was willing and 
able to “undertake new business” in order to become eligible to serve on 
new cases.181  The Council also appointed Judge Daugherty to temporarily 
take over the assignment of cases.182  Judge Chandler, in turn, objected to 
the December 13 Order on the basis that it affixed a new condition to the 
exercise of his judicial office.183  Arguably, Judge Chandler’s objection 
 
177. See Memorandum from Abraham Fortas, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to the Brethren 
(Jan. 18, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress) (“At the suggestion of the Chief Justice I am 
circulating the following as a possible substitute per curiam for this case . . . .”). 
178. See id. (“It appearing to the Court from the response submitted by the Solicitor General on 
behalf of the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit that the order from which relief is sought is entirely 
interlocutory in character . . . .”).   
179. See Letter from Byron White, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Earl Warren, Chief Justice, 
U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 19, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress) (“I prefer your formulation 
of the denial of stay to that of Brother Fortas and I have no objection to your entering it in this form.”). 
180. See Letter to Byron White, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 19, 1966) (on file with the 
Library of Congress) (echoing Chandler I’s per curiam opinion was Justice White’s “formulation”). 
181. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 78–97 (explaining the Council’s Order to Judge Chandler).  The 
extent of the Order read: 
[The] Honorable Stephen S. Chandler shall take no action whatsoever in any case or proceeding 
now or hereafter in the United Stated Court for the Western District of Oklahoma; that all cases 
and proceedings now assigned to or pending before him shall be reassigned to and among the 
other judges of said court; and that until further order of the Judicial Council no cases or 
proceedings filed or instituted in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Oklahoma shall be assigned to him for any action whatsoever. 
Id. at 78.   
182. See id. (ordering agreement on the division of cases and that if one could not be internally 
reached, the Judicial Council would take further steps).   
183. See, e.g., Renewal of Application for Stay, Reply to Memorandum Opposing Initial 
Application for Stay, and Motion to Strike and Expunge Said Memorandum at 8–9, Chandler v. Judicial 
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maintained the ripeness of his appeal despite the majority’s conclusion 
otherwise.  Once more, the Court denied Judge Chandler relief.184 
While Justices Douglas and Black dissented from the denial of the stay, 
they acknowledged that judicial councils for each federal court of appeals 
had been statutorily created, and that the law vested administrative authority 
in the courts of appeals over the district courts within their respective 
circuits.185  They dissented on the basis that the Council had overstepped 
its constitutional authority and intruded into the legislative prerogative to 
impeach.186  The Council’s action against Judge Chandler, they concluded, 
had threatened the independence of the judiciary.187  Perhaps it was in 
reaction to the January 21 Dissent that Judge Chandler, on the same day, 
filed a motion to reconsider in which he accused the Council of engaging in 
a “shocking departure from customary bounds of accepted standards by the 
inclusion of gratuitous defamatory statements.”188 
Both Judge Chandler and the Council were active during the Court’s 
deliberations.  On January 14, 1966, Judge Chandler informed the other 
district court judges of the Council’s December 13 Order demanding that 
he cease from hearing cases, and that he desired that the other judges’ 
confirm his conclusion that the Council had (in effect) issued a de facto writ 
 
Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 382 U.S. 1003 (1966) (No. 1111, Misc.) [hereinafter Renewal 
of Application for Stay] (“Failure to grant a stay will only compound the confusion for litigants in 
Judge Chandler’s court . . . [he] regrets the additional burden this entails for the other judges in his 
court.”). 
184. See Chandler I, 382 U.S. at 1003–04 (noting Judge Chandler was denied relief pursuant to 
his Renewal of Application for Stay).   
185. Id. at 1004.   
186. See id. at 1005–06 (Black, J., dissenting) (noting the powers of impeachment granted to the 
Legislative Branch by the Constitution).   
187. Id. at 1006.  Justice Black’s conclusory statement reads:  
To hold that judges can do what this Judicial Council has tried to do to Judge Chandler here 
would in my judgment violate the plan of our Constitution to preserve, as far as possible, the 
liberty of the people by guaranteeing that they have judges wholly independent of the 
Government or any of its agents with the exception of the United States Congress acting under 
its limited power of impeachment.  We should stop in its infancy, before it has any growth at all, 
this idea that the United States district judges can be made accountable for their efficiency or lack 
of it to the judges just over them in the federal judicial system. 
Id. 
188. Renewal of Application for Stay, supra note 183, at 1. 
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of prohibition against him.189  Judge Chandler also explained his reasons 
for seeking relief from the Court rather than appearing before the panel.190  
He pointed out that because no litigant in any pending case had sought his 
recusal or filed a writ of mandamus to the appellate court, he believed the 
Council was without any power to act under its governing statute, and that 
his appearance before the Council would be interpreted (in essence) as 
waiving this argument.191  Second, in regards to the cases already under 
adjudication, Judge Chandler claimed that as the sitting District Chief Judge, 
he was the only judge with the authority to issue orders or rulings to the 
litigant parties.192 
Additionally, Judge Chandler had a conversation with his colleague, Judge 
Daugherty, in which he protested the division of his pending cases to the 
other judges.193  As previously noted, customarily, the district chief judge 
was responsible for creating a “secret lot” in which cases were assigned to 
available judges based on the date in which the various actions were filed 
with the court.194  However, Judge Daugherty had attempted an equitable 
division of future cases, which negated the secrecy required by the existing 
rules.195  Judge Daugherty responded by suggesting that he convene a 
meeting of the district court judges to work out an agreement on how to 
divide Judge Chandler’s cases amongst themselves.196  But this too nullified 
the existing local rules on case division because it ignored the principle of 
the “secret lot.” 
 
189. Letter from Stephen Chandler, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla., to 
the Judges on the U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla. 1 (Jan. 14, 1966) (on file with the Library 
of Congress).   
190. Id. at 2. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 3. 
193. See Letter from Stephen Chandler, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla., 
to Fred Daugherty, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla. (Jan. 24, 1966) (on file with the 
Library of Congress) (“There is no provision of law that grants a Judicial Council Jurisdiction over 
cases pending before a Judge in the various stages of the judicial process after valid assignment to 
him.”).   
194. 28 U.S.C. § 137 (1976); see also Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 77 (noting the chief justice of the 
court is primarily responsible for assigning cases).   
195. See Letter from Stephen Chandler, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla., 
to Clerk’s Office (Jan. 19, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress) (suggesting implications of 
Daugherty’s actions).   
196. Letter from Fred Daugherty, Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla., to Stephen 
Chandler, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla. (Jan. 21, 1966) (on file with the 
Library of Congress).   
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On January 24, 1966, Judge Chandler wrote to his fellow district judges 
informing them that while “he objected to the removal and the 
reassignment” of his cases that were pending as of December 28, 1965, he 
did not object “to the assignment of all new cases to judges other than 
himself.”197  On the next day, the district court judges notified the Council 
that while they “had agreed on the division of new business . . . they could 
not agree on the assignment to other judges of cases then pending before 
Judge Chandler.”198  Contemporaneously, the Justice Department 
motioned Judge Chandler to recuse himself from a trial between the United 
States and an Oklahoma litigant arising from a tax dispute.199  The New 
York Times covered Judge Chandler’s initial refusal to withdraw from the 
case, and his later agreement to recuse himself.200 
In response to the district court judges’ inability to agree on a division of 
cases, the Council instructed them that it would hold a new hearing on 
February 10, 1966.  However, after being informed that no district court 
judge intended to appear before it, the Council decided not to hold this 
meeting; instead it decided to consider the disagreement of case assignments 
at the February 4 meeting.201  Judge Chandler had independently notified 
the Council that he objected to its assertion of jurisdiction in prospectively 
removing all cases from him, and suggested that he would not attend the 
administrative proceedings.202  Regardless, the Council maintained its 
December 13 Order prohibiting Judge Chandler from presiding over any 
new trials until the hearing.203   
On the last day of January, the Oklahoma Transportation Company’s 
counsel filed a notice of amicus brief to the Court siding with 
 
197. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 79; Letter from Stephen Chandler to Fred Daugherty, supra 
note 193 (copying to the letter other district court judges).   
198. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 79 (expressing an attempt by the Judges to form an agreement).  
199. See Fred P. Graham, Oklahoma Judge Clashes with U.S.: Justice Department Objects to His Hearing 
Tax Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1966, at 51 (suggesting the Justice Department would object to 
Judge Chandler’s hearing of a Federal tax dispute).   
200. See id. (insisting Judge Chandler initially refused to withdraw from the case); Chandler Averts 
Clash with U.S.: Federal Judge Withdraws from Oklahoma City Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1966, at 13 (detailing 
Judge Chandler’s eventual agreement to recuse himself, however, noting that “[Judge] Chandler seems 
determined to continue to try private cases, in defiance of the [J]udicial [C]ouncil’s order, until the 
Supreme Court rules on his case”).   
201. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 79–80 (discussing the Council’s consideration of the 
disagreement amongst the district judges on the division of business).   
202. See Letter from Stephen Chandler to Clerk’s Office, supra note 195 (outlining 
Judge Chandler’s objection to the Council’s Order).   
203. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 80 (suggesting the Council maintained its Order).   
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Judge Chandler and requesting reconsideration.204  The company was a 
party in an action against the United States on Judge Chandler’s docket 
scheduled for trial on February 1, 1966.205  The company’s counsel insisted 
that the Council’s action would result in a trial delay to the financial 
detriment of the company and enable the government to seek 
reconsideration of rulings favorable to the company that Judge Chandler 
had already issued.206  It also argued that the Council’s action bypassed the 
two recognized means for judicial disqualification: a motion for judicial 
recusal based on bias or prejudice subject to appellate review, and voluntary 
disqualification.207  Although the corporation raised a meritorious claim in 
the sense that the losing party would be able to argue several motions for 
reconsideration, this did not lead Justice White to rethink his position.  After 
conferring with the Court, Justice White appointed Richard Bevan Austin, 
a United States District Court Judge serving in the Northern District of 
Illinois, to the trial involving the corporation.208 
On February 4, the Council—still asserting it was acting under 28 U.S.C 
§§ 137 and 332—issued a second Order which authorized Judge Chandler 
to proceed with the cases already assigned to him.209  The February 4 Order 
also barred Judge Chandler from serving on any new cases.210  This 
February 4 Order did not mollify Judge Chandler; again, he asked the Court 
for a writ of mandamus.211  Judge Chandler’s objection was two-fold.212  
First, he argued the Council, acting within its administrative capacity, lacked 
authority to reassign a district court’s cases; and second, if the Council was 
 
204. See Motion of Real Parties in Interest for Leave to File and Motion to Stay Amicus Curiae 
at 4, Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 382 U.S. 1003 (1966) (No. 1111, 
Misc.) (requesting immediate adjudication of the case, noting that any further delay would be 
“disastrous to hundreds of litigants and attorneys”).   
205. Id. at 1.  This letter was sent via Western Union telegram.  Id.   
206. Id. at 4. The telegram claimed $400,000 in damages were at stake, alleging “[t]he very life 
and future operation of the Oklahoma Transportation Company and Affiliated Public Utility Motor 
Carriers make immediate trial vital.”  Id. at 1–2. 
207. Id. at 2.   
208. Letter from Byron White, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to John Davis, Clerk, U.S. Supreme 
Court (Feb. 3, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress).  Apparently, because the Northern District 
of Illinois resided within the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Justice White believed that the 
appearance of favoritism to the government was nullified.  Id. 
209. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 80 (citing to the Order rendered from the February 4, 1966 
meeting of the Judicial Council).   
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 75–76.   
212. See id. at 82 (evaluating the arguments of (1) the constitutional rights of a confirmed federal 
judge; and (2) the statutory authorization of judicial councils to supersede those constitutional rights). 
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acting as the Tenth Circuit en banc, it exceeded its authority to order a 
blanket recusal against a district court judge.213   
Five days after the February 4 Order’s issuance, Solicitor General 
Marshall filed a memorandum to the Court arguing Judge Chandler’s appeal 
had become moot because Judge Chandler had essentially agreed to the 
Council’s February 4 Order.214  Judge Chandler, in turn, filed a notice to 
the Court disagreeing with the Solicitor General’s assertion that he had 
acquiesced to the February 4 Order, and further stated that he had only 
“acquiesced” to the other district court judges’ memorandum to the Council 
in order to prevent the Council’s intervention under 28 U.S.C. § 127.215  
Yet, Judge Chandler also believed that he made it clear that he had not 
acquiesced to any bar from serving on future trials, because he had refrained 
from specifically addressing the Council’s stated reasons for his removal.216  
This became a contested issue in the Court when it finally granted review.   
On July 12, 1967, the Council reconvened, and this time, it modified its 
February 4 Order by asking the district court judges to internally agree on a 
new division of cases.217  Judge Chandler argued in a memorandum to the 
other district court judges that the Council had “illegally” attempted to 
“create a situation in which the Council could assert its powers under 
28 U.S.C. § 137” because the judges were already in agreement as to the 
division of cases, with the exception of Judge Chandler—who was barred 
from being assigned new cases.218  The district court judges, including 
 
213. Id. at 83–84.  But see id. at 83 n.5 (“We note that nothing in the statute or its legislative 
history indicates that Congress intended or anyone considered the Circuit Judicial Councils to be courts 
of appeals en banc.”).   
214. Id. at 84.  The Solicitor General essentially argued that the Court had jurisdiction to rule 
on the writ of mandamus filed by Judge Chandler.  Id.  However, he concluded: “[T]hat even though 
there is appellate jurisdiction in this Court, nonetheless it ought not to be exercised since the Order of 
December 13 has been superseded for four years by the Order of February 4, the terms of which have 
been expressly approved by petitioner.”  Id. 
215. Id. at 81. 
216. Id.  Judge Chandler argued: 
[H]is acquiescence in the division of new business settled upon by his fellow district judges was 
given deliberately for reasons of “strategy” in order to prevent any possibility that the Council 
could find that “the district judges are unable to agree upon the adoption of rules of orders” for 
the distribution of business and assignment of cases under 28 U.S.C. § 137.   
Id. 
217. Id. at 81–82 (indicating the reconvening of the Judicial Council).   
218. Letter from Stephen Chandler to Clerk’s Office, supra note 195.  The Western District 
Judges, including Judge Chandler himself, wrote the Judicial Council: “[T]he current order for the 
division of business in this district is agreeable under the circumstances.”  Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 82.  
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Judge Chandler, finally responded to the Council that the division of cases 
was “agreeable,” and that it was not necessary to issue another order.219  
Judge Chandler, of course, still believed a constitutional impediment to the 
Council’s actions remained, and filed an appeal to the Court.220  It took two 
years and a new Chief Justice for the Court to decide to grant review.221 
II.    JUDGE CHANDLER, THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, AND ETHICS REFORM 
On February 15, 1966, Senator Joseph Tydings (a Maryland Democrat 
and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery 
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary) convened a hearing for the 
purpose of determining whether federal judges could be removed only 
through the impeachment process, and if so, whether there should be a new 
law empowering the judiciary to remove “unfit” judges.222  Senator Fred 
Hart (a Michigan Democrat) joined Senator Tydings in the hearing, but the 
Committee’s third member, Senator Hugh Scott (a Republican from 
Pennsylvania), did not.223  Senator Tydings called the Council’s actions 
against Judge Chandler a “charade,” and stated that “[the] Judicial Council’s 
abortive action in the Chandler case created havoc in the Western District of 
Oklahoma.”224  Senator Tydings listed a number of shortcomings on the 
part of the Council, including that the appellate judges failed to give 
Judge Chandler notice of the first hearing, provided no evidence to him, 
specified no charges against him, and refused to give him an opportunity to 
defend himself.225  Although Senator Tydings may have exaggerated the 
impact of the Council’s conduct on the district courts, one might agree with 
 
However, Judge Chandler retained his argument that “the Council has usurped the impeachment 
power, committed by the Constitution to the Congress exclusively.”  Id.  While Judge Chandler agreed 
that there were some “legitimate administrative purposes” under the statute, they “do not include 
stripping a judge of his judicial function as he claims was done here.”  Id. 
219. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 88–89. 
220. Id. at 75–76. 
221. Compare id. at 82 (indicating the Judicial Council met in late September 1967 to reconsider 
the need for the February 4th Order to stay), with id. at 74 (noting the date of oral argument before the 
Supreme Court was set for December 10, 1969).   
222. U.S. S. Judicial Fitness Hearings, supra note 12, pt. I, at 1 (statement of Joseph D. Tydings, 
Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach.).   
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 2.  It should be noted that Tydings wanted to make it clear that he did not have 
enough evidence to refute an allegation that Judge Chandler was unfit, or that the Council did not rely 
on any evidence.  See id. at 3 (mentioning the legal issues and facts surrounding the situation between 
Judge Chandler and the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit had not yet been determined). 
225. Id. at 2. 
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him when he accused it of “bringing ridicule” to the federal judiciary.226  
Senator Tydings then read Senator Samuel Ervin’s statement into the 
record, in which Senator Ervin argued that the Council had acted 
unconstitutionally against Judge Chandler, and that Justices Douglas and 
Black were correct in their dissents.227   
Senator Ervin had also privately defended Judge Chandler against the 
Tenth Circuit.228  He admitted to a constituent that he had no personal 
knowledge of Judge Chandler, but insisted that the Tenth Circuit had 
engaged in unjustified and dangerous actions.229  That a senator issued this 
criticism should have caused concern in the Judicial Branch, but it was cause 
for greater concern that at the time, Senator Ervin was also a member of the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary.230 
Finally, one of the witnesses, Joseph Borkin, an attorney who authored a 
book titled The Corrupt Judge,231 testified that even if the allegations against 
Judge Chandler (regarding his unwillingness to adjudicate cases) were true, 
the Council had acted unjustly by failing to provide any evidence to 
substantiate the charges.232  Although the Subcommittee hearing evidenced 
a complete legislative disagreement with the Council, this did not result in 
the Court reconsidering its earlier ruling, or in the Council altering its 
February 4 Order.  While several other events in fact did open the door to 
the Court addressing Judge Chandler’s second petition, the Court’s actions 
should be studied with regard to its own internal difficulties. 
 
226. Id. at 2–3. 
227. Id. at 5 (statement of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., as presented by Sen. Joseph D. Tydings, 
Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach.). 
228. Id.  In this speech, Senator Ervin reminded Congress that he had previously come to 
Judge Chandler’s defense.  See id. pt. II, at 206–07 (statement of Hon. William L. Murray, J. of the 
Superior Court of the State of Cal. and response by Sen. Joseph D. Tydings, Chairman, S. Subcomm. 
on Improvements in Judicial Mach.) (admitting the rule utilized in the Chandler case had come up in a 
private lunch in which it was referred to as an awful provision). 
229. Letter from Sam Ervin, U.S. Senator, to Professor Phillip Kurland (Jan. 14, 1966) (on file 
with the Library of Congress).   
230. See Nominations of Fortas & Thornberry Hearing, supra note 46, at 2 (showing Senator Ervin as 
a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee).   
231. JOSEPH BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE (World Publ’g Co. 1966).  The full description of 
Borkin’s book is The Corrupt Judge: An Inquiry into Bribery and Other High Crimes and Misdemeanors in the 
Federal Courts.  Id. at iii.  The book is not about Judge Chandler.  Id. at 300–01.   
232. U.S. S. Judicial Fitness Hearings, supra note 12, pt. I, at 71–72 (statement of Joseph Borkin, 
esquire). 
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In 1969, Justice Abe Fortas resigned from the Supreme Court rather than 
face a probable impeachment trial.233  The previous year, during 
Justice Fortas’s Chief Justice confirmation hearings, journalists discovered 
that he had been paid a large sum of money for serving as an adjunct 
professor at the American University Law School.234  The ethics rules 
governing federal judges did not prohibit employment as an adjunct 
professor, and arguably such employment was consistent with a judge’s duty 
to serve as an ambassador of the law.235  Moreover, the students who 
studied under a Supreme Court Justice had theoretically benefitted in their 
legal education.  However, Justice Fortas’s salary was paid through an 
endowment created by Louis Wolfson—a convicted financier who 
Justice Fortas had previously advised.236  Justice Fortas’s association with 
Wolfson alone might not have been cause for an impeachment hearing, but 
he also failed to testify accurately to the Senate during his confirmation 
hearings regarding his advice to President Johnson on the United States’ 
involvement in the Vietnam Conflict.237   
In addition to accusations against Justice Fortas, on April 15, 1970, 
Congressman Gerald Ford—the Republican minority leader in the House 
of Representatives—accused Justice Douglas of violating several ethics 
rules, as well as undermining United States national security.238  Several of 
Congressman Ford’s allegations were not new to the House.  Throughout 
the 1960s, several legislators, in particular Southern Democrats, had 
demanded investigations into Justice Douglas, based on the Justice’s four 
marriages as well as his financial relationship to a casino owner.239  
However, Congressman Ford also alleged that Justice Douglas’s political 
activities—and publication of a book titled Points of Rebellion—proved the 
 
233. Robert Taft, Jr., Statement on the Resignation of Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas 
(May 15, 1969) (on file with the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Taft’s Statement on Justice Fortas’ 
Resignation].   
234. BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICE 142–49 (1988). 
235. Cf. id. (outlining the ethical duties of federal judges in regards to Justice Fortas).   
236. Id.  
237. Id. 
238. See 116 CONG. REC. 11915 (1970) (“But this is only the beginning of the insolence by 
which Mr. Justice Douglas has evidently decided to sully the high standards of his profession and defy 
the conventions and convictions of decent Americans.”).   
239. See Judgment Day for Justice Douglas, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 27, 1970, at 20 (reporting on Mr. Ford’s 
proposal to investigate the conduct of Justice Douglas).   
 126 ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS [Vol. 8:90 
Justice wanted the government toppled.240  The House Judiciary 
Committee investigated Congressman Ford’s allegations against Justice 
Douglas but found no wrongdoing.241 
A. Congress, the Court, and Judicial Ethics Reforms 
By the end of 1968, there was a general perception in Congress that the 
ethical standards of the federal judiciary were far too malleable.  On 
February 25, 1969, Senator Ervin referred a draft bill to the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary which would have prohibited federal judges and 
magistrates from “engag[ing] or participat[ing] [in] . . . ‘the exercise of any 
power, or the discharge of any duty, which is conferred or imposed upon 
any officer or employee of the executive branch or the legislative branch of 
the government.’”242  Senator Ervin’s Bill sought to prevent judges from 
advising a president regarding drafting a non-judicial legislation.243   
At the same time, Senator Tydings introduced a bill to create a 
“Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure” which would be 
composed of five judges and chaired by the chief justice.244  This proposed 
Commission would have the power to inquire into the conduct of all federal 
judges.245  If four or more of the judges agreed that a federal judge had 
violated judicial standards, the Commission would recommend to the 
House Judiciary Committee that the judge be subject to impeachment.246  
On November 6, 1969, Senator Tydings addressed the Catholic University 
Law School on the need for judicial reform in which he claimed that 
Congress had to legislate a standard of “good behavior” for the judiciary 
 
240. See 116 CONG. REC. 11914–17 (1970) (contending Justice Douglas’s activities and behavior 
while serving on the Supreme Court evidenced seditious intent).   
241. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 29 (Princeton Univ. Press ed. 1966) (“Although 
Justice Douglas’s life-style, including his four marriages, and much of his decision making provoked 
hostile reactions from many Republicans, the impeachment investigation ultimately exposed and 
perhaps diffused the personal or partisan motivations for his attempted impeachment.” (citation 
omitted)). 
242. 115 CONG. REC. 4299 (1969) (quoting S. 1097, 91st Cong. (1969)).  
243. See id. at 4298–99 (noting the dangers of allowing the President to appoint judges to 
positions in which they would be performing non-judicial duties).   
244. Id. at 6218.   
245. See id. (stating the commission “would act to retire or remove a judge only after an 
investigation and a formal hearing held in accordance with the requirements of due process”).   
246. Judicial Disabilities, Tenure and Conflicts of Interests Acts, S. 1516, 91st Cong. § 377, 
115 CONG. REC. 6226–27 (1969) (enacted).   
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because the judiciary had failed to follow its own standards.247  
Senator Tydings cited to Justice Fortas’s resignation, as well as “the 
Chandler case,” as his reason to push for new legislation.248  He also 
reminded his audience that on June 10, 1969, when Chief Justice Warren 
pushed the Judicial Conference to prepare a code of ethics, his efforts 
faltered because of “dimming of judicial resolve” by the Supreme Court.249  
Senator Tydings, moreover, argued that mandatory reporting of income and 
gifts (as well as regulations on judicial activities) were not a threat to the 
judiciary’s independence, but rather, that such regulations would serve to 
bolster public confidence in the judiciary.250  He concluded: “The threat 
will pass only when the members of the federal judiciary realize that not 
every attempt to monitor their conduct constitutes ‘hazing’ . . . .”251 
On May 8, 1969, then Congressman Robert Alphonso Taft, Jr., the 
grandson of Chief Justice and former president William Howard Taft, 
introduced H.R. 11109—a Bill that would have required federal judges to 
provide to the Comptroller General their complete tax filings (including any 
spousal incomes) as well as the names and addresses of professional 
corporations, businesses, foundations, or other enterprises in which the 
judge served as a compensated officer or consultant.252  The Bill would 
 
247. Joseph D. Tydings, Senator, Address at the Catholic Univ. of Am. (Nov. 6, 1969) 
(transcript on file with the Library of Congress). 
248. See id. (commenting on the controversies surrounding the Judiciary and how each 
controversy “demonstrated anew critical problems of judicial temperament and public disapproval of 
undisclosed outside activities of judges and undisclosed financial holdings”).   
249. See id. (discussing the Judicial Conference’s move to reform the Judiciary, and the Supreme 
Court’s failure to implement reform guidelines imposed on other federal judges on itself).   
250. See id. (emphasizing the need for judges to disclose the amount of compensation received 
for any “off-the-bench activity”).   
251. Id. 
252. H.R. 11109, 91st Cong. § 470 (1969); Letter from Robert Taft, Jr., U.S. Representative, to 
Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm. (May 26, 1969) (on file with the Library of 
Congress).  Taft wrote: 
As you know, on May 8, the Honorable Gerald Ford and I introduced H.R. 11109, to provide for 
financial disclosure by members of the Federal judiciary. 
In view of recent developments, I feel the Committee should consider whether it would be 
appropriate at this time to schedule hearings on this proposal.  In making this request, I recognize, 
of course, the recent call by the Chief Justice for action by the Judicial Conference, as well as the 
constitutional questions involved. 
Id.  Additionally, Gerald Ford wrote separately to Congressman Celler on May 28, stating: “Honorable 
Robert Taft, Jr., and I have introduced H.R. 11109, to provide for financial disclosure by members of 
the Federal judiciary.  This legislation has been referred to your committee and I would very much 
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have also required judges to list their real property, personal property, and 
trust interests valued at over $10,000.253  Finally, Congressman Taft’s Bill 
required judges to report all financial liabilities (such as home loans and lines 
of credit) valued at over $5,000.254  Ostensibly, Congressman Taft’s Bill, 
like Senator Ervin’s and Senator Tydings’, was introduced as a means to 
build public confidence in the impartiality of federal judges following 
Justice Fortas’s resignation.255  On November 4, 1969, Congressman Taft, 
along with Congressman Ford, formally requested that Congressman Celler 
schedule a hearing on H.R. 11109—particularly because three days earlier, 
the Judicial Conference rescinded a rule prohibiting judges from earning 
outside income.256  Congressman Celler, however, was non-committal 
about when a hearing would be scheduled.257  Congressman Taft’s inability 
to move the Bill to a House Judiciary Committee hearing proved frustrating, 
and he complained to a University of Cincinnati Law School professor, 
explaining that he saw “no reason why a thorough investigation of such 
conflicts of interest should not be carried out[,]” adding that 
Congressman Ford was in the process of investigating “at least one member 
of the Court.”258  Arguably, because of Judge Chandler’s investments and 
financial relationships, he would have had to alter his extra-judicial behavior 
if any of these Bills became law.   
In concert with these legislators, Chief Justice Warren was concerned 
with the Justices’ extra-judicial activities and convened a Judicial Conference 
to convince the Justices to adopt a more stringent ethics code, mirroring the 
code governing the lower federal courts.259  On June 10, 1969, the Judicial 
 
appreciate anything which you may do to schedule hearings on the proposal.”  Letter from Gerald 
Ford, U.S. Representative, to Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm. (May 28, 1969) 
(on file with the Library of Congress). 
253. H.R. 11109, § 470(b)–(c). 
254. Id. § 470(e). 
255. See Taft’s Statement on Justice Fortas’ Resignation, supra note 233 (referring to Justice 
Fortas’ resignation as “a solution which maintains the integrity of the Court”). 
256. Letter from Robert Taft, Jr., U.S. Representative, to Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the 
House Judiciary Comm. (Nov. 4, 1969) (on file with the Library of Congress).   
257. See Letter from Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm., to Robert Taft, 
Jr., U.S. Representative (Nov. 7, 1969) (on file with the Library of Congress) (stating the Committee 
would address the issue “as soon as [the Committee’s] schedule permits”).   
258. Letter from Robert Taft, Jr., U.S. Representative, to C.M. Hulley, Professor (Dec. 5, 1969) 
(on file with the Library of Congress).   
259. See Fred P. Graham, Justices Rebuff Warren on Code: Most of Colleagues Defer Action on Suggestion 
on Ethics Until Fall Term, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1969, at 1 (discussing Justice Warren’s conference 
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Conference issued guidelines to govern the conduct of judges.260  The 
Judicial Conference was, in effect, responding to Tydings’ Bill, and, indeed, 
matched its guidelines to the proposed Bill.261  The guidelines included the 
creation of a judicial board to monitor the income and assets of other 
judges.262  Several judges opposed these guidelines, and petitioned Chief 
Justice Burger (who had succeeded Chief Justice Warren) to re-evaluate their 
efficacy.263  Justice Douglas took the step of explaining to the Justices his 
reasons for opposing the Judicial Conference’s new rules.264  He challenged 
that judges should have no role in telling each other what to do, and asked 
whether the Supreme Court would also be monitored and overseen by 
judges in the lower judiciary.265  Any new requirements on judges, he urged, 
had to be enacted by Congress.266  It also likely galled Justice Douglas that 
judges would now have to first seek the Conference’s approval before 
publishing an article, travelling, or accepting compensation for lecturing or 
writing.267  He claimed he deplored seeing a cloistered life of the judiciary 
and believed a rule requiring judges to submit their literary work or speeches 
for review was merely a form of judicial censorship.268 
 
proposal to “formally adopt a standard of judicial conduct similar to that approved . . . by the Judicial 
Conference” which “applies only to lower court judges”).   
260. See JUD. CONF. U.S., REP. PROCS. SPECIAL MEETING JUD. CONF. U.S. 42–43 (1969) 
[hereinafter JUD. CONF. U.S. REP. (1969)], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/1969-03.pdf [perma.cc/6AVL-R76F] (listing the 
resolutions passed at the meeting).   
261. See Judicial Reform Act, S. 1506, 91st Cong., 115 CONG. REC. 6220–24 (1969) (enacted) 
(proposing guidelines similar to those suggested by Tydings).   
262. S. 1510, 91st Cong., 115 CONG. REC. 6225 (1969) (enacted).   
263. See, e.g., Letter from John Harlan, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Warren Burger, Chief 
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 31, 1970) (on file with the Library of Congress) (explaining to the 
Chief Justice reasons why actions of the Judicial Conference should be suspended).   
264. Memorandum from William Douglas, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to the Judicial 
Conference of the U.S. (Aug. 8, 1970) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
265. Cf. Douglas Defends Judge’s Rights, LONGVIEW NEWS J. (Texas), Jun. 4, 1970, at 6 (“William 
O. Douglas, the Supreme Court’s most controversial justice, has entered an impassioned defense of 
the right of federal judges to speak their minds and pursue an independent course.”). 
266. See Memorandum from William Douglas to the Judicial Conference of the U.S., supra 
note 264 (“[I]t is plainly not in the competence of the judges to write such a law as I said in the Chandler 
case.”).   
267. Cf. JUD. CONF. U.S. REP. (1969), supra note 260, at 42 (“A judge in regular active service 
shall not accept compensation of any kind, whether in the form of loans, gifts, gratuities, honoraria or 
otherwise, for services hereafter performed or to be performed . . . .”). 
268. See Douglas Defends Judge’s Rights, supra note 265 (“William O. Douglas, the Supreme Court’s 
most controversial justice, has entered an impassioned defense of the right of federal judges to speak 
their minds and pursue an independent course.”). 
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B. House Judiciary Investigation into Judge Chandler and the Judicial Council 
On February 22, 1966, Congressman Harold Royce Gross, a Republican 
from Iowa, introduced H.R. Res. 739, authorizing and directing the 
Committee on the Judiciary “as a whole or by subcommittee, to inquire into 
and investigate the official conduct” of Judge Chandler, Judge Murrah, and 
Judge Bohanon.269  Congressman Gross did not specifically seek an 
impeachment against any of the judges, rather, he drafted H.R. Res. 739 “to 
determine whether in the opinion of said committee the said judges or any 
of them have been guilty of any high crime or misdemeanor which in the 
contemplation of the Constitution requires the interposition of the 
constitutional powers of the House.”270  Thus, while Congressman Gross 
did not overtly seek impeachment through H.R. Res. 739, its use of the 
“high crime or misdemeanor” standard contemplated impeachment as a 
possibility—even though it did not propose whether Judge Chandler, 
Judge Murrah, or Judge Bohanon should be the investigation’s greater 
focus.271   
Impeachment is a different matter than an investigation into judicial 
conduct.272  Impeachment processes begin at the Judiciary Committee, and 
then, if articles of impeachment are drafted, these are provided to the full 
House.273  If the full House approves the articles by a majority vote, the 
articles transition into the Senate for an impeachment trial.274  
 
269. H.R. Res. 739, 89th Cong. (1966) (enacted).  It is difficult to discern Gross’s connection 
to this particular investigation: he was not appointed to the Judiciary Committee, he did not appear to 
have a connection to any of the parties, and his state (Iowa) resided on the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit.  See generally David W. Schwieder & Dorothy Schwieder, The Power of Prickliness: Iowa’s 
H.R. Gross in the U.S. House of Representatives, 65 ANNALS IOWA 329 (2006) (presenting biographical 
details on Harold R. Gross).  However, he had a reputation for being a conservative Republican, often 
at odds with his own party.  See BILL KAUFFMAN, AIN’T MY AMERICA: THE LONG NOBLE HISTORY 
OF ANTIWAR CONSERVATISM 124 (1st ed. 2008) (showing that Gross voted against the Marshall Plan, 
the space program, and military spending, often against the Eisenhower and Nixon Administrations); 
see also Schwieder & Schwieder, supra, at 334 (“Not surprisingly, party leaders opposed Gross’s 
candidacy.”).  As an exasperated Gerald Ford once quipped, “[t]here are three parties in the House: 
Democrats, Republicans, and H. R. Gross.”  Id. at 358. 
270. H.R. Res. 739, 89th Cong. (1966) (enacted). 
271. See id. (outlining the high crimes and misdemeanors standard for determining whether the 
House is in a position to exercise its constitutional powers).   
272. See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 241, at 26 (distinguishing between the impeachment 
process and an investigation into judicial misconduct).   
273. See id. (detailing the impeachment process).   
274. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (assigning the power of impeachment solely to the House 
of Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (delegating the power to try all impeachments solely 
to the Senate).  
 2017] The Right to an Independent Judiciary 131 
Constitutionally, a single member of the House may initiate an impeachment 
vote against a president, vice president, or executive officer whose position 
occurred as a result of the Senate confirmation process.275  The 
Constitution requires two-thirds of the senators present to concur on the 
individual’s removal from office.276  The operative basis for impeachment, 
as noted, is the commission of “high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”277  
Fifteen federal judges, since the Nation’s founding, have been impeached, 
and only eight of them have been convicted and removed.278 
On receipt of Congressman Gross’s request, Congressman Celler 
consulted with Congressman Howard W. Smith, the Chairman of the Rules 
Committee, before forming a subcommittee under H.R. Res. 739 to 
investigate Judge Chandler, Judge Murrah, and Judge Bohanon.279  The 
reason for Congressman Celler’s consultation related to the unusual nature 
of H.R. Res. 739, which did not directly call for impeachment.280  Given 
the language of H.R. Res. 739, the investigation may have had no choice but 
to adopt the standards associated with impeachment.281  As Chairman of 
the House Judiciary Committee, Congressman Celler had the authority to 
appoint two other congressmen.282  To this end, he selected Jack Brooks 
of Texas, and William St. Onge of Connecticut.283  Congressman William 
 
275. See, e.g., III ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 2342, 2400, 2469 (1907) (“The impeachment . . . was 
set in motion on the responsibility of one [m]ember of the House . . . .”).   
276. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (requiring two-thirds of the members of the Senate to be 
present to render a conviction in an impeachment proceeding).   
277. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
278. U.S. S. Judicial Fitness Hearings, supra note 12, pt. I, at 55 (statement of Joseph Borkin, 
esquire).   
279. Letter from Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm., to Howard W. 
Smith, Chairman of the House Rules Comm. (Feb. 23, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress); 
Letter from Emanuel Celler to Jack Brooks, supra note 94.   
280. Cf. H.R. Res. 739, 89th Cong. (1966) (enacted) (calling for findings and resolutions of 
impeachment); Letter from Emanuel Celler to Jack Brooks, supra note 94 (suggesting Mr. Brooks 
consult additional information regarding H.R. Res. 739). 
281. See H.R. Res. 739 (“Said committee shall report its findings to the House, together with 
such resolutions of impeachment or other recommendations as it deems proper.”).   
282. See Letter from Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm., to William St. 
Onge (Feb. 23, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress) (advising St. Onge that he had appointed 
members of the subcommittee); Letter from Emanuel Celler to Jack Brooks, supra note 94 (asking 
Brooks to chair the Ad Hoc Special Subcommittee). 
283. Letter from Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Comm., to H.R. Gross, U.S. 
Representative (Feb. 23, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress).   
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McCulloch (the ranking Republican on the Judiciary Committee) appointed 
Congressman Richard Poff of Virginia.284   
All three of the congressmen were lawyers.285  Brooks was born in 1922, 
served in the Marine Corps in World War II, and graduated from the 
University of Texas School of Law in 1949.286  He was first elected to 
Congress in 1953, and he served for four decades.287  St. Onge was born in 
1914, served in the Army during World War II, and (after the war) graduated 
from the University of Connecticut’s School of Law.288  He had been 
appointed as a prosecutor and municipal judge, and was then elected Mayor 
of Putnam Township before his election to Congress in 1962.289  Like 
Brooks and St. Onge, Poff was a World War II veteran.290  He graduated 
from the University of Virginia’s School of Law and was elected to Congress 
at the age of twenty-nine.291  In 1970 (after the failed nominations of 
Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court), 
President Richard Nixon considered nominating Congressman Poff to the 
Court—but Congressman Poff asked him to withdraw his name from 
consideration.292 
On April 30, 1968, the H.R. Res. 739 subcommittee issued its final 
report—concluding that all three of the judges “brought discredit” to 
themselves and had “demeaned [the] administration of justice in their 
courts.”293  The investigation found fault in each judge, but it specifically 
noted the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council’s lack of discretion in dealing with 
 
284. Id. 
285. See LAURA KALMAN, THE LONG REACH OF THE SIXTIES: LBJ, NIXON, AND THE 
MAKING OF THE CONTEMPORARY SUPREME COURT 259 (2017) (stating Poff graduated from the 
University of Virginia School of Law); Douglas Martin, Jack Brooks, Former Texas Congressman, Dies at 
89, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/us/politics/jack-brooks-
former-texas-congressman-dies-at-89.html [perma.cc/A42E-LQTF] (stating Congressman Brooks 
studied law at the University of Texas); St. Onge, William Leon, (1914-1970), BIOGRAPHICAL 
DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S000769 
[perma.cc/4NAS-4WUU] (acknowledging St. Onge “was admitted to the bar in 1948 . . . [and] 
commenced the practice of law in Putnam”). 
286. Martin, supra note 285. 
287. Id. 
288. St. Onge, William Leon, supra note 285.   
289. William St. Onge of Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1970, at 33.   
290. EARL JOHNSON, TO ESTABLISH JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF CIVIL 
LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 226 (2014). 
291. Id. 
292. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS POWELL JR. 3 (Maxwell Macmillian Int’l ed. 1994); 
KALMAN, supra note 285, at 259–65. 
293. West, supra note 11, at 13 (citation omitted).   
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Judge Chandler.294  The report concluded by criticizing how the judges let 
themselves become embroiled in undignified “personal and political 
rivalries.”295  Ultimately, the House Judiciary Committee concluded there 
was insufficient evidence for impeachment.296   
Although the report, for a variety of reasons, might have made for 
salacious reading based on Judge Chandler’s personal history, the most 
important aspect of it had to do with its conclusion regarding the 
constitutionality of the Council’s action in removing cases from 
Judge Chandler.  It declared the attempt to squelch Judge Chandler was 
“completely beyond the legal authority of the Council . . . .  Congress has 
never authorized circuit judges to inquire into the fitness of a district judge 
to hold his office and to remove him if they so determine.”297  Thus, the 
subcommittee issued its definitive answer to the Council’s removal of 
Judge Chandler from adjudicating cases: its action was unconstitutional.298  
Equally important is the difference between the House investigation and the 
Senate investigation—the House investigation was convened to examine the 
conduct of these specific judges and not to examine whether new laws were 
required for judicial governance.299   
Perhaps less significant to the Supreme Court (and not in the public’s 
general knowledge) was that other prominent legislators outside of the 
House Judiciary Committee took an interest in Judge Chandler, and indeed, 
sided with him.  For instance, Judge Chandler himself questioned the 
Assistant Attorney General as to why the Justice Department had not 
assigned a federal prosecutor to represent him against O’Bryan and the local 
district attorney, or to appoint him counsel when he argued his cause before 
the Court.300  Further, because on two occasions Justices Black and 
 
294. Id. at 13–14 (citation omitted). 
295. Id. at 13 (citation omitted). 
296. Id. (citation omitted). 
297. Id. at 13–14 (citations omitted); see also Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 137 (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]here is no power under our Constitution for one group of federal judges to censor or discipline 
any federal judge and no power to declare him inefficient and strip him of his power to act as a judge.”). 
298. See West, supra note 11, at 13–14 (citation omitted) (pronouncing the action against 
Judge Chandler “forbidden by the Constitution”).  
299. Compare H.R. Res. 739, 89th Cong. (1966) (enacted) (requesting specific examination of 
Judge Chandler, Judge Murrah, and Judge Bohanon), with Shipley, supra note 14, at 178 (analyzing 
Tydings’ efforts to reform the Judiciary by commencing an investigation into “the availability of and 
need for procedures to govern removal, retirement, and disciplining of unfit Federal judges” (quoting 
U.S. S. Judicial Fitness Hearings, supra note 12, pt. I, at 1)). 
300. Letter from Stephen Chandler, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Okla., to 
John Douglas, Assistant U.S. Attorney General (Mar. 4, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
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Douglas sided with Judge Chandler in his appeals,301 it might have 
surprised them that Judge Chandler was never accused of corruption by the 
Republican Senator John J. Williams.302  Senator Williams publicly called 
for Justice Douglas’ resignation throughout his career,303 and was known 
as “The Conscience of the Senate,” for investigating corruption in 
government.304  In doing so, Senator Williams sometimes communicated 
with Chicago entrepreneur E.L. Albright.305  It was Albright who provided 
Senator Williams with derogatory information on both Justice Douglas and 
Judge William Campbell (of the Northern District of Illinois) over their 
relationship to Albert Parvin, a Las Vegas casino owner who funded a 
foundation designed to promote democracy in Latin America.306  
Evidently, it was true that Justice Douglas received a yearly stipend from 
Parvin’s foundation.307  Consequently, during his communication with 
 
301. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 129–41 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with 
whom Mr. Justice BLACK concurs, dissenting.”); Chandler I, 382 U.S. at 1004–06 (Black, J., dissenting) 
(showing Justice Black’s disagreement with the Judicial Council’s Order issued against Judge Chandler, 
and that Justice Douglas sided with Justice Black).   
302. Williams was also known as the “Sherlock Holmes of Capitol Hill.”  John J. Williams, 
SPARTACUS EDUC., http://spartacus-educational.com/JFKwilliamsJ.htm [perma.cc/FZ58-TLYZ].  
His “Sherlock” antics attributed to an effort to unseat Justice Douglas.  CAROL E. HOFFECKER, 
HONEST JOHN WILLIAMS: U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 224 (2000).  Ultimately, although Senator 
Williams found distaste in Justice Douglas’ behavior, he never accused Judge Chandler of any sort of 
corruption.  Cf. Jim Lichtman, The Conscience of the Senate, IT’S ETHICS, STUPID! (July 30, 2008), 
https://ethicsstupid.com/personalities/the-conscience-of-the-senate/ [perma.cc/2V8N-VMKY] 
(“[Williams] always informed the subject of an investigation of his findings personally before he 
announced them publicly, and never once in twenty-four years did he falsely accuse anyone.”).   
303. HOFFECKER, supra note 302, at 224. 
304. Lichtman, supra note 302. 
305. See, e.g., Letter from E.J. Albright to John Williams, U.S. Senator (Jan. 5, 1966) (on file with 
the Library of Congress) [hereinafter January 5th Letter from Albright to Williams] (expounding on 
the unsavory behavior of Justice Douglas and Judge William Campbell—a federal district judge).   
306. January 5th Letter from Albright to Williams, supra note 305; Letter from E.J. Albright to 
John Williams, U.S. Senator (Jan. 7, 1966) (on file with the Library of Congress) [hereinafter January 
7th letter from Albright to Williams].  
307. See F.B.I. Kept Close Watch on Douglas, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1984, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/07/22 [perma.cc/H67X-LDY5] (reporting on the investigations into 
connections between Douglas and organized crime related to gambling); Fred Barbash, Justice Douglas’ 
Memoirs, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1980, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/ 
1980/09/11/justice-douglas-memoirs/7c3f55c5-bed8-4359-8a9a-5306bbdfee93/?utm_term=.47eef1 
6ba70f [perma.cc/KH8J-MWGY] (highlighting Justice Douglas’ speculation that the “news stories 
about his receipt of a salary from the Parvin Foundation” was an attempt to “tie him in” with Parvin’s 
gambling concessions); Judgment Day for Justice Douglas, supra note 239 (“Most recently, there has been 
some evidence that [Justice Douglas] performed legal work for the private Parvin Foundation in 
violation of the rules of his office (in addition to collecting a $20,000 annual fee from it) . . . .”).   
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Senator Williams, Albright suggests it was Judge Chandler who informed 
him that “hoodlum[s]” in Chicago boasted of making payoffs to “certain 
members of the U.S. Supreme Court.”308 
III.    JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS AND DECISION 
As discussed above, by 1970, three independent efforts for judicial 
reform—one in the House, one in the Senate, and one within the federal 
judiciary itself—were underway.309  These efforts contextualize the 
Supreme Court’s approach to Chandler II, particularly in light of the 
majority’s failure to note any legislative action regarding Judge Chandler in 
its opinion.310  On December 10, 1969, the Court heard argument on 
Judge Chandler’s new appeal, but it was not until June 1, 1970, that the 
Justices issued their decision.311  Befittingly, not long after the decision’s 
publication, Judge Chandler filed a statement saying that he refused to 
disclose his personal assets to the Conference despite the new disclosure 
rule, and argued that only Congress had the authority to force him to do 
so.312  Eight days after oral arguments on Chandler II, a news report issued 
announcing that the House Judiciary Committee had issued a confidential 
report criticizing the Judicial Council for exceeding its authority.313  The 
paper also recognized that the House Committee was sharply critical of 
Judge Chandler and his colleagues for engaging in personal and political 
rivalries “that have ‘brought discredit on [their] courts.’”314 
 
308. Cf. January 7th Letter from Albright to Williams, supra note 306 (“As Judge Stephens 
Chandler told me some time ago . . . .”).   
309. See supra Part II (outlining the different independent efforts for judicial reform underway).   
310. See generally Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 77–89 (failing to consider legislative action regarding 
Judge Chandler in the majority opinion).   
311. Id. at 74.   
312. Stephen Chandler, Statement Regarding Filing of Financial Report Required by Judicial 
Conference of the U.S. (1970) (on file with the Library of Congress).  After arguing that only Congress 
could place such requirements on judges, Judge Chandler added:  
It is not a proper judicial function for one judge or body of judges to lay down personal rules of 
conduct for other judges.  I am not curious about the financial affairs of other judges.  Their 
conduct is none of my personal or official business nor is it the proper business of any other 
judge or body of judges.   
Id.  News media reported Judge Chandler’s refusal, but this did not alter the Court’s decision.  See, e.g., 
Judge Cites His Reasons for Refusal, OKLA. CITY TIMES, Aug. 7, 1970, at 10 (providing an account of 
Judge Chandler’s refusal to comply with financial disclosure requests).   
313. MacKenzie, supra note 18, at 12-A. 
314. Id.  
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In a new brief, Judge Chandler argued to the Court that all of the 
Council’s orders relating to him placed conditions on the exercise of his 
constitutional power as a judge, and that in issuing these orders, the Council 
usurped Congress’ impeachment power and undermined judicial 
independence.315  He conceded that the Council was statutorily vested with 
administrative authorities, but argued that the stripping of any judicial 
functions was a constitutional act, and therefore exceeded any 
administrative authority.316  Judge Chandler’s argument essentially aligned 
with the House Judiciary Committee’s conclusions.317  The Council argued 
that the Court lacked jurisdiction because in issuing the Orders against 
Judge Chandler it had acted in an administrative, rather than judicial, 
capacity.318  The Council’s arguments rested on the assumption that 
because Congress had not authorized judicial review when it enacted the 
statutes creating the Judicial Conference and judicial councils, the Court 
could not exercise jurisdiction over its administrative positions, unless 
Judge Chandler had been removed from all judicial duties.319  Solicitor 
General Erwin Griswold (Marshall’s successor) argued in an amicus brief 
that because the Council had acted in an en banc capacity, any appeal had 
to be considered through the All Writs Act, and that Judge Chandler’s 
complaint merited a review—even under the high standards of the Act.320  
However, Griswold ended with the argument that Chief Justice Burger 
would parrot, namely, that Judge Chandler had rendered his appeal to the 
Court moot because he had acquiesced to the Council’s final Order.321 
A. The Court’s Deliberations 
On March 27, 1970, Chief Justice Burger circulated his first draft to the 
Justices with the caveat that he wanted to dispose of the appeal “on the 
narrowest basis [he saw] as valid.”322  Chief Justice Burger’s first draft 
 
315. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 82–83.   
316. See id. (“[P]etitioner contends that the legitimate administrative purposes to which it may 
be turned do not include stripping a judge of his judicial functions as he claims was done here.”). 
317. Compare West, supra note 11, at 13–14 (discussing the Commission on the Judiciary 
Committee report which found only Congress had impeachment authority over judges), with Chandler 
II, 398 U.S. at 80 (looking to Judge Chandler’s brief which suggested the same).   
318. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 83. 
319. Id. 
320. Id. at 83–84.  
321. Id. at 84. 
322. Memorandum from Warren Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to the U.S. 
Supreme Court (Mar. 27, 1970) (on file with the Library of Congress).   
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contained a scant, one paragraph legal analysis, in which he concluded that 
only if the Council had acted in a judicial capacity could the Court review 
Judge Chandler’s appeal “without doing violence to the constitutional 
requirement that such review be appellate.”323  Essentially, this meant that 
Chief Justice Burger agreed with the Council’s determination that (unlike 
judicial decisions) a Council’s administrative acts were not subject to 
appellate review.324  Yet, Chief Justice Burger believed there was a 
secondary basis to deny Judge Chandler an appeal.325  He opined that even 
if the Council had engaged in a judicial act, Judge Chandler made an express 
agreement to the February 4 Order, and therefore, any case or controversy 
had been eliminated by Judge Chandler himself.326  But this conclusion 
ignored Judge Chandler’s reasonable argument that he had not acquiesced 
to the Council’s February 4 Order,327 and that the House subcommittee 
investigation had sided with Judge Chandler and against the Council.328  
Regardless, on March 30, Justice White informed Chief Justice Burger that 
he would join in his opinion without seeking any modification.329 
Although Justice Brennan agreed with Chief Justice Burger’s conclusions, 
he took issue with the statement that Judge Chandler had acquiesced to the 
February 4 Order.330  He discerned that Judge Chandler’s agreement with 
the February 4 Order was not “express”—as both the Council and the 
Solicitor General had characterized it—but rather that Judge Chandler only 
agreed with the limited purpose of preventing the Council from acting under 
28 U.S.C. § 137.331  To Justice Brennan, this proved that Judge Chandler’s 
 
323. Warren Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Unpublished Draft Opinion (Mar. 27, 
1970), in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 398 U.S. 74 (1970) (on file with 
the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Burger, March 27 Unpublished Draft Opinion].   
324. See id. (“If the challenged action of the Judicial Council was a judicial act or decision by a 
judicial tribunal, then perhaps it could be reviewed by this Court without doing violence to the 
constitutional requirement that such review be appellate.”).   
325. See id. (commenting on a missing requirement of “case or controversy”). 
326. Id. 
327. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 90 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Judge Chandler immediately 
responded that he did not in any way concede the Council’s power to enter the February 4 Order, and 
that his indication of acquiescence made to the Council did not constitute such a concession.”).   
328. See West, supra note 11, at 13–14 (discussing the House subcommittee’s report which 
found the Council’s actions forbidden by the Constitution).   
329. Cf. Letter from Byron White, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Warren Burger, Chief Justice, 
U.S. Supreme Court (Mar. 30, 1970) (on file with the Library of Congress) (requesting the Chief Justice 
to join Justice White in the opinion).   
330. Letter from William Brennan, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Warren Burger, Chief 
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 1, 1970) (on file with the Library of Congress). 
331. Id. 
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agreement with the Order did not “eliminate[] whatever case or controversy 
theretofore existed.”332  Justice Brennan added that Judge Chandler’s 
“tenacity in pursuing his case here for several years seems quite inconsistent 
with any conduct indicating acquiescence.”333  Nonetheless, like Chief 
Justice Burger, Justice Brennan wanted the decision to maintain the 
principle that the Court could not review the Council’s administrative 
decisions, and he remained willing to join with Chief Justice Burger as to the 
ultimate conclusion of the appeal.334 
On May 15, Chief Justice Burger circulated another draft and, for the first 
time, emphasized that Judge Chandler had been a defendant in suits 
involving both civil and criminal matters.335  While Chief Justice Burger’s 
reasoning is absent from the papers of the other Justices, it may have been 
the case that he wanted to assure the legal academy that the Council had 
acted reasonably.336  Chief Justice Burger also conceded that 
Judge Chandler may have believed he had not acquiesced to the Council’s 
Orders, but the opinion still maintained that Judge Chandler had in fact 
done so through his actions.337  On May 19, 1970, Chief Justice Burger 
circulated another draft opinion, which contained only stylistic alterations 
from the May 15 draft.338  A few days later, Justice Brennan informed Chief 
Justice Burger that he would join in the opinion.339  At that point, Chief 
 
332. Id. (quoting Burger, March 27 Unpublished Draft Opinion, supra note 323). 
333. Id. 
334. Id. 
335. Warren Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Unpublished Draft Opinion (May 15, 
1970), in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 398 U.S. 74 (1970) (on file with 
the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Burger, May 15 Unpublished Draft Opinion]. 
336. Cf. Hugo Black, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Unpublished Draft Dissent (1970), in 
Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 398 U.S.’ 74 (1970) (on file with the 
Library of Congress) [hereinafter Black, Unpublished Draft Dissent] (responding to Chief Justice 
Burger’s draft opinion, and asserting that the mention of the two suits was irrelevant since the criminal 
complaint had been quashed and the civil suit arose from a defendant in a criminal case who charged 
Judge Chandler with malicious prosecution and sought compensation).  This suit likewise was 
dismissed.  Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 89. 
337. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 86–87. 
338. Compare Burger, May 15 Unpublished Draft Opinion, supra note 335 (noting the language 
and format), with Warren Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Unpublished Draft Opinion 
(May 19, 1970), in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 398 U.S. 74 (1970) (on 
file with the Library of Congress) (including almost identical language and format to the May 15 draft).   
339. Letter from William Brennan to Warren Burger, supra note 330. 
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Justice Burger only needed three other justices to join with him since Justice 
Marshall had recused himself, and Justice Fortas had resigned.340   
In December of 1969, Justice Douglas conveyed his draft dissent to 
Justice Black who informed him that he intended to join in it, but suggested 
modifying some of Justice Douglas’ strident language.341  Justice Black also 
told Justice Douglas that while he would join in the dissent, he intended to 
separately dissent as well.342  Justice Black’s original dissent, written in 
pencil, is almost verbatim to his published dissent.343  Justice Black 
designed his dissent as a defense of Justice Douglas, rather than attack on 
the majority.344 
Justice Douglas’ dissent characterized Judge Chandler’s appeal as one of 
the “liveliest, most controversial contest[s] involving a federal judge in 
modern United States history.”345  It is clear—whether Justice Douglas 
intended to use his dissent as an attack on the various efforts to amend the 
code of judicial ethics as well as to defend against attacks on himself—that 
the dissent carried strong language against any encroachment into judicial 
independence.346   
 
340. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 88 (“Mr. Justice MARSHALL took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case.”); Taft’s Statement on Justice Fortas’ Resignation, supra note 233 (noting 
Justice Fortas had resigned from the Court). 
341. Letter from William Douglas, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Hugo Black, Justice, U.S. 
Supreme Court (Dec. 31, 1969) (on file with the Library of Congress); see also Memorandum from Hugo 
Black, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 5, 1970) (on file 
with the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Memorandum from Black to Justices]; William Douglas, 
Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Unpublished Draft Dissent (Dec. 1969), in Chandler v. Judicial Council 
of the Tenth Circuit of the U.S., 398 U.S. 74 (1970) (on file with the Library of Congress) (noting 
Justice Black’s hand-written notes on Justice Douglas’s draft dissent indicated approval).   
342. Memorandum from Black to Justices, supra note 341.   
343. Compare Black, Unpublished Draft Dissent, supra note 336 (setting forth an opinion almost 
exactly the same to the one Justice Black authored in Chandler II), with Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 141–43 
(Black, J., dissenting) (exhibiting the same language as Justice Black’s earlier penciled dissent). 
344. See Black, Unpublished Draft Dissent, supra note 336 (indicating the dissent is a defense of 
Justice Douglas’ opinion).   
345. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 130 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
346. See, e.g., id. at 136–37 (“An independent judiciary is one of this Nation’s outstanding 
characteristics.  Once a federal judge is confirmed by the Senate and takes his oath, he is independent 
of every other judge.”).  Justice Douglas specifically wrote: 
The mood of some federal judges is opposed to this view and they are active in attempting to 
make all federal judges walk in some uniform step.  What has happened to petitioner is not a rare 
instance; it has happened to other federal judges who have had perhaps a more libertarian 
approach to the Bill of Rights than their brethren.  The result is that the nonconformist has 
suffered greatly at the hands of his fellow judges. 
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B. The Decision 
Chief Justice Burger began his published decision with a brief but 
incomplete history of Judge Chandler’s appeal.347  For instance, nowhere 
in the majority opinion was there a mention of the House Judiciary 
Committee’s inquiry into Judge Chandler, Judge Murrah, and 
Judge Bohanon’s conduct.348  Instead, Chief Justice Burger noted simply 
that in December 1965, the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit convened 
a special session and issued an order—and this description, he felt, 
adequately detailed the “long history of controversy between 
[Judge Chandler] and the Council.”349  After this brief description of the 
story between Judge Chandler and the Judicial Council, Chief Justice Burger 
then moved to the question of whether the Council had diminished 
Judge Chandler’s constitutional powers.350  Chief Justice Burger recognized 
Judge Chandler’s allegation that the Council effectively stripped him of his 
judicial authority, but also wrote that the Council countered by arguing that 
it had merely undertaken an administrative prerogative granted by 
Congress.351  Chief Justice Burger also acknowledged Judge Chandler’s 
argument that the Council usurped Congress’ impeachment authority 
through its March 27 Order removing him from further cases.352 
He then turned to the constitutional nature of the issue, that is, whether 
the actions of the Council had negatively impacted the judicial independence 
of the federal trial judges in the Western District of Oklahoma.353  He made 
 
Id. at 137.  He also coined: “All power is heady thing as evidenced by the increasing efforts of groups 
of federal judges to act as referees over other federal judges.”  Id. 
347. Id. at 75–82 (majority opinion). 
348. See generally id. (failing to mention the investigation that spawned from H.R. Res. 739).   
349. Id. at 77.  Chief Justice Burger also placed 28 U.S.C. § 332—the operative statute 
establishing judicial councils—into a footnote, and noted that the Council based its authority on this 
decision.  Id. at 76 n.1.   
350. Id. at 75–82, 84.   
351. Id. at 82–83.  In addition to recognizing the Council’s primary argument, Chief 
Justice Burger also noted that the Council effectively urged the Court to find that the controversy no 
longer existed because Judge Chandler and the other district court judges had agreed to the division of 
judicial labor in the district.  Id. at 84. 
352. Id. at 82. 
353. Id. at 84.  Here, Chief Justice Burger noted: 
Whether the action taken by the Council with respect to the division of business in 
Judge Chandler’s district falls to one side or the other of the line defining the maximum 
permissible intervention consistent with the constitutional requirement of judicial independence 
is the ultimate question on which review is sought in the petition now before us. 
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it clear that the majority recognized that judicial independence was a 
hallmark of democracy.354  However, having recognized the importance of 
the constitutional question at hand, he then turned to the reason the Court 
would not grant review of the actual question involved.355  A writ of 
mandamus, or prohibition such as Judge Chandler had sought, could only 
be granted by the Court if the writ was issued “in aid of [the Court’s] 
jurisdiction.”356  Because Judge Chandler had acquiesced to the Council’s 
February 4 Order, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that he could not seek 
relief in the Court.357  Instead, Chief Justice Burger determined that 
Judge Chandler would first have had to seek relief in the Council—in order 
to present a true case or controversy—and, that at the time the Court 
reviewed Judge Chandler’s appeal, no justiciable case or controversy 
existed.358   
In short, Chief Justice Burger led the majority of the Court to find that 
because the Council had acted within its administrative authority, and 
Judge Chandler had either acquiesced to this authority or had not sought a 
further remedy through the Council, no constitutional dispute between the 
 
Id. 
354. Id.  The Court specifically held:  
There can, of course, be no disagreement among us as to the imperative need for total and 
absolute independence of judges in deciding cases or in any phase of the decisional function.  But 
it is quite another matter to say that each judge in a complex system shall be the absolute ruler of 
his manner of conducting judicial business. 
Id. 
355. Id. at 86.  Under the “All Writs Act,” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), the Court had to determine 
whether to grant a writ in light of an aid to its own jurisdiction.  Id. at 86 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. 137, 173–80 (1803)).  The specific wording of the Act is: “The Supreme Court and all courts 
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective 
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”  Id. at 76 n.2 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1651(a) (1988)).  One might conclude that Judge Chandler’s appeal clearly fell within the plain 
language of this Act because his allegation against the Judicial Council was that it interfered with the 
independence of the district courts to the detriment of not only of the Judge, but also the principle of 
separation of powers, as well as the right to an impartial trial judge.  See id. at 84 (delineating aspects of 
the reasoning behind Judge Chandler’s appeal).  Moreover, it was highly probable after the Council 
issued its Order that one appeal to the Supreme Court would originate in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma—or at least within one of the other districts within the 
Tenth Circuit.  Cf. id. at 86 (referring to a challenged Judicial Council action, and suggesting, “perhaps 
it could be reviewed by this Court”).   
356. Id. at 86 (quoting Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 582 (1943)).   
357. Id. at 87–89. 
358. Id. 
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district court and the Council existed.359  Although Chief Justice Burger did 
not overtly apply an exhaustion of administrative remedies test to the 
decision, it can be inferred that he adopted the basic tenets of this test by 
implication.360  To this end, Chief Justice Burger finished the decision by 
acknowledging that Judge Chandler could, in the future and under narrow 
circumstances, refile an appeal for a writ of mandamus or prohibition 
against the Council.361 
Justice Harlan concurred with the result, but chastised the majority for 
acknowledging that the first question in Judge Chandler’s appeal was one of 
jurisdiction, yet failing to answer whether jurisdiction existed.362  The 
central question, Justice Harlan believed, was whether the Council’s actions 
were administrative; that is, whether the actions fell outside of Article III 
review, or whether they were judicial and therefore subject to appellate 
review.363  He conceded in the middle of his concurrence that while several 
of the roles Congress provided for the Council to undertake (such as 
appointing and firing clerks, designing process forms and court seals, or 
designating court times) were “trivial” and, therefore, unlikely to be 
reviewable in an Article III court, none of these “trivial” duties had an effect 
on the independence of trial judges.364  But he maintained that the Council’s 
actions presented an issue of constitutional dimension.365  Further, Justice 
Harlan pointed out that Congress had never addressed the question of 
whether the actions of the councils were exempted from the All Writs 
Act.366   
To Justice Harlan, there were three aspects of Judge Chandler’s appeal 
that required the Court to rule.  First, whether the actions of the Council 
presented a case or controversy.367  Second, whether the Court had 
 
359. Id. 
360. See generally Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938) (“[N]o one 
is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative 
remedy has been exhausted.”).  See also LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION 424–58 (1965) (laying out the basic tenants of the test for exhaustion of administrative 
remedies).   
361. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 89 (implying the Court could not review Judge Chandler’s appeal 
plainly because he did “not ma[k]e a case for the extraordinary relief of mandamus or prohibition” 
(emphasis added)). 
362. Id. at 89–90 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
363. Id. at 95.   
364. Id. at 110–11. 
365. Id. at 111.   
366. Id. at 112.   
 367. Id. at 89.  
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jurisdiction.368  Finally, whether the Judicial Council had acted within its 
statutory authority.369  Regardless of whether Judge Chandler was 
pressured to acquiesce to the Council’s February 4 Order or whether he 
volunteered to accept the February 4 Order, Justice Harlan pointed out that 
the Court still had an independent duty to assess whether the Council had 
acted within its constitutional and statutory authority.370  Moreover, 
Justice Harlan disagreed with the majority’s belief that Judge Chandler had 
to renounce his acquiescence to the Council in order to prove that a 
controversy still existed.371  He further criticized the majority for suggesting 
that a district court could review the Council’s decisions since the decisions 
were purely administrative.372 
Justice Harlan next turned to the question of the Court’s jurisdiction to 
hear Judge Chandler’s appeal.  After reviewing the legislative intent 
underlying the creation of the councils, he determined that the Court did 
affirmatively possess jurisdiction.373  He reasoned that because the judicial 
councils were statutorily created, partly to ensure judicial efficiency in the 
district courts, this meant that the councils had the ability to participate in 
the “management of the judicial work of the circuit.”374  In other words, 
the councils possessed a supervisory role over the district courts, and in the 
event an order was issued from a council (such as the Orders issued to 
Judge Chandler as well as the other judges in the Western District of 
Oklahoma), the Orders necessarily affected the litigation in the district 
 
 368. Id. at 95.  
369. Id. at 111.   
370. Id. at 90–92.  
371. Id. at 91–92.  Justice Harlan specifically criticized the majority for stretching Rescue Army v. 
Municipal Court of Los Angeles and concluding that Judge Chandler’s failure to seek an administrative 
remedy deprived the Court of jurisdiction.  Id. at 92–93 (citing Rescue Army v. Mun. Court of L.A., 
331 U.S. 549 (1947)).  Rescue Army arose from a challenge against a municipal ordinance prohibiting 
“door to door” solicitations for charity.  Rescue Army, 331 U.S. at 550.  The California Supreme Court 
determined, somewhat ambiguously, that although it would not issue a writ of prohibition against Los 
Angeles’ enforcement of the ordinance, the plaintiffs still had a route to challenge the ordinance 
through a trial in case the plaintiffs were convicted.  Id. at 579.  Additionally, the plaintiffs had twice 
been convicted in municipal court, but the superior court had reversed the convictions.  Id. at 553.  
Because Rescue Army arose from a state enforcement action and the plaintiff had another trial pending 
with the possibility of full state appellate review, one might conclude that Justice Harlan’s criticism of 
the majority appears justified.  See generally id. (“As in [Judge Chandler’s] case, the Court’s action had 
the effect of rejecting the appellant’s claim of a right to obtain relief without further proceedings in a 
lower tribunal[.]” (quoting Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 93 (Harlan, J., concurring))).   
372. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 93–94 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
373. Id. at 103–05. 
374. Id. at 98. 
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courts.375  To Justice Harlan, this meant that the Orders were judicial, not 
administrative, and therefore, the Court possessed jurisdiction under the All 
Writs Act to review orders, such as the March 27  Order issued by the 
Council to Judge Chandler.376 
Justice Harlan next assessed whether the Council had acted lawfully.  He 
conceded that the March 27 Order was problematic, but because the 
Council superseded its March 27 Order in its February 4 Order, and because 
this second Order was purely administrative (he coined it as “an effort to 
move along judicial traffic in the District Court”), no constitutional 
infirmity, such as the removal of a judge short of impeachment, arose from 
it.377  Justice Harlan cited United States v. Malmin,378 a 1921 decision, for the 
proposition that courts of appeals have the administrative authority to 
ensure the continual movement of cases through the district courts.379  In 
Malmin, the governor general of the United States Virgin Islands removed a 
duly appointed federal judge and appointed a new judge without Senate 
confirmation.380  The Third Circuit ordered the dismissed judge to return 
to his judicial duties because the governor general had acted without 
authority.381  Justice Harlan, however, concluded that the Judicial Council’s 
February 4 Order, unlike the governor general’s in Malmin, placed a 
requirement on Judge Chandler only to certify that he was able to conduct 
further trials, and that therefore no permanent bar existed.382   
Finally, Justice Harlan found it dispositive that the Council’s February 4 
Order comported with the legislative intent underlying 28 U.S.C. § 332, and 
found it unnecessary to address the Council’s secondary argument that it 
had also complied with 28 U.S.C. § 137.383  Notwithstanding Justice 
Harlan’s comprehensive analysis of the majority, he too seems to have 
missed a critical point in the history of Judge Chandler’s appeal.  Despite 
one’s feelings about Judge Chandler’s dubious conduct, one might clearly 
 
375. Id. at 106.   
376. Id.  Justice Harlan reasoned that if the Court were to determine that the Council’s action 
was administrative in nature, then the Council would have usurped the authority of the district court.  
Id. at 102. 
377. Id. at 118–19. 
378. United States v. Malmin, 272 F. 785 (3d Cir. 1921). 
379. See id. at 792 (“[C]onfessedly this court has power to restore the orderly proceedings of the 
trial court by commanding the absent judge to return and transact its business.”). 
380. Id. at 787–88.   
381. Id. at 792. 
382. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 120–21 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
383. Id. at 126.  
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recognize the Council’s failure to assert a strong quantum of evidence that 
he had been slow to rule on cases or that a backlog of trials existed. 
Like Justice Harlan, Justice Douglas chastised the majority for not 
considering the constitutional questions raised by the Council’s actions.384  
While it was true that the majority determined Judge Chandler had 
“acquiesced” to the Council’s February 4 Order, the Council had clearly 
concluded that there was an ongoing controversy between Judge Chandler 
and itself by continuing the March 27 Order.385  Like the majority, 
Justice Douglas did not note that the Legislative Branch had already taken 
cognizance of the in-fighting between Judge Chandler and 
Judge Murrah.386  Instead, Justice Douglas reminded his fellow Justices that 
in 1941, in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner,387 the Court found 
efforts by courts of appeals to expedite cases through the district courts 
through the establishment of rules governing en banc hearings to be 
characterized as functions that are inherently judicial, rather than 
administrative.388  To Justice Douglas, the Council’s February 4 Order to 
Judge Chandler did not erase the impact of its March 27 Order because 
Judge Chandler remained disqualified from serving on new cases and 
remained under the stigma of the March 27 Order.389 
Justice Douglas then turned to the constitutional implications in the 
majority’s decision.  “An independent judiciary is one of this Nation’s 
outstanding characteristics.  Once a federal judge is confirmed by the Senate 
and takes his oath, he is independent of every other judge[,]” 
Justice Douglas argued.390  “He commonly works with other federal judges 
who are likewise sovereign.  But neither one alone nor any number banded 
together can act as censor and place sanctions on him.”391  Justice Douglas 
tried to remind the majority that only Congress could determine whether a 
judge had the qualifications or proper conduct for continued judicial 
 
384. Cf. id. at 132–33 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting Judge Chandler’s central argument was 
that it was “illegal for the Council to deprive him of new cases”). 
385. See id. at 90 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“In light of this continued challenge to the order, the 
Solicitor General in March 1966 agreed ‘that the case can no longer be deemed moot.’”).   
386. See generally id. 129–42 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (omitting legislative notice of an altercation 
between Judge Chandler and Judge Murrah).   
387. Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm’r, 314 U.S. 326 (1941). 
388. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 134–35 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Textile Mills, 314 U.S. 
at 326). 
389. Id. at 135. 
390. Id. at 136. 
391. Id. 
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service.392  Additionally, he noted the Supreme Court lacked the authority 
to censor or discipline any federal judge.393  The dangers inherent in the 
Council’s actions, he concluded, “may have profound consequences” in that 
they enable any of the councils to ensure a particular district court judge is 
foreclosed from sitting on “a racial case, church-and-state case, [or] a free 
press case . . . .”394  Had Justice Douglas ended on this note, his argument 
might have appeared to be a pure constitutional disagreement between the 
dissent and the Burger-led majority.  However, Justice Douglas turned to a 
list of his complaints about judicial administration.   
Oddly, Justice Douglas’s primary anger appears to have been directed at 
the actions of the Judicial Conference of the United States—the statutorily 
created “administrative function” consisting of the chief justices of the 
circuit courts, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, and occasionally chief 
judges of the district courts.395  Today, among its myriad of duties, the 
Judicial Conference is responsible for studying the performance of the 
courts in order to promote judicial efficiency, but it can also conduct 
investigations, and it has subpoena authority.396  Moreover, as previously 
noted, the Conference annually reports to Congress on its proceedings.397  
Perhaps in response to the Senate investigation into Justice Fortas and his 
eventual resignation in May 1969, the Conference issued a resolution which 
authorized the judicial councils to pass judgment as to whether a judge could 
serve as the executor of a will or teach at a law school.398  Justice Douglas 
pointed out that none of these constraints on judges were constitutional 
until, perhaps, Congress enacted new rules, but such judicially imposed 
constraints (Justice Douglas labelled them judicial “hazing”) suggested they 
could likewise be used to intimidate judges and encroach on their 
independence.399  Justice Douglas concluded: “It is time we put an end to 
 
392. Id. 
393. See id. at 136–37 (emphasizing no federal judge nor a group of federal judges may sanction 
another federal judge). 
394. Id. 
395. Id. at 136–39; see also Judicial Code of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, ch. 646, § 331, 62 Stat. 
902, 902 (proposing the parties attend the Judicial Conference).   
396. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2012). 
397. Id. 
398. See Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 137–38 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“On June 10, 1969, the Judicial 
Conference adopted resolutions for the governance of many activities of circuit judges and district 
judges.”); see also Taft’s Statement on Justice Fortas’ Resignation, supra note 233 (referencing charges 
against Justice Fortas that ultimately led to his resignation in May of 1969). 
399. Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 140–41. 
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the monstrous practices that seem about to overtake us, by vacating the 
orders of the Judicial Council that brand Judge Chandler as unfit to sit in 
oncoming cases.”400  Although Justice Black joined in Justice Douglas’ 
dissent, he also separately dissented, and accused the majority of “break[ing] 
faith with [the] grand constitutional principle” of an independent 
judiciary.401 
IV.    THE USE OF CHANDLER 
For almost a decade after Chandler II, neither the judicial nor legislative 
branches acted to clarify the extent to which the judicial councils could 
administratively supervise district court judges, or for that matter, the judges 
on the courts of appeals.  In 1973, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
In re Imperial “400” National Inc.,402 addressed its own Judicial Council’s 
authority to promulgate rules through a tortuous examination of the 
relationship between the Council and a district court.403  One year earlier, 
the Judicial Council for the Third Circuit issued a rule preventing a lawyer 
from representing a trustee if the lawyer’s firm had also submitted a 
bankruptcy plan or overseen a bankruptcy proceeding involving the 
trustee.404  The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
upheld the rule after an attorney challenged that its application created a 
forced severance of an existing attorney-client relationship.405  While the 
rule may have been important, the fact that the Third Circuit ultimately sat 
in judgment of its own rule—or that a district court found that the Council’s 
rule was lawful—should have raised a question as to whether the right to an 
independent and impartial appellate review existed in this situation.  The 
appellate court determined, however, that it was not sitting in judgment of 
 
400. Id. at 141. 
401. Id. at 142 (Black, J., dissenting).  It should be noted that Justice Douglas joined 
Justice Black in this separate dissent.  Id. at 141. 
402. In re Imperial “400” Nat’l, Inc., 481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1973). 
403. Id. at 45–46.   
404. Id. at 42.  
405. Id.  However, it should be noted that in Nolan v. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit, the Judicial 
Council advanced the argument of the district court that, the district court did not possess jurisdiction 
to examine its rule on the basis that “no case or controversy” arose as a result of its implementation.  
346 F. Supp. 500, 511 (D. N.J. 1972), aff’d, In re Imperial “400” Nat’l, Inc., 481 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1973).  
Nolan was the predecessor decision to Imperial.  See Imperial, 481 F.2d 41, 42 (3d Cir. 1973) (“On May 2, 
1972[,] the district court, pursuant to this resolution, removed appellant, Joseph M. Nolan, Esq., as 
counsel[.]”). 
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itself, rather, it determined that it sat in judgment of the lower court.406  
Although the aggrieved party sought certiorari, the Supreme Court never 
granted review.407 
One legal scholar commented that the majority in Chandler II 
“sidestepped [the] core issue” in front of the Court.408  As evidenced by In 
re Imperial, this is a charitable description of what the majority accomplished 
in Chandler II, for its legacy in one significant area—the lack of a formal 
standard of proof to assess any judicial discipline—created an unintended 
means for diminishing judicial independence.409  This is not to argue that 
there is the same lack of standards in the present time as there was in 1970, 
or that Judge Chandler’s conduct would be acceptable under present 
standards.  Concededly, since Chandler II’s issuance, one might believe that 
both Congress and the courts have brought greater clarity and discernable 
standards to judicial regulation.  Nonetheless, there remain dangers to 
judicial independence that the Court could have solved in 1970.  
A. Legislative Responses to Chandler  
In 1980, and in response to Chandler II, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C § 372, 
an act referred to as the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and 
Disability Act.410  This Act empowered the judicial councils to determine 
when a judge is encumbered by a disability.411  It was also enacted to 
provide greater public transparency to the adjudication of complaints 
against judges.412  Today, the Act essentially enables a judicial council to 
find that if a judge is unable to function due to physical or mental disability, 
the president may appoint another judge (subject to Senate confirmation), 
 
406. Imperial, 481 F.2d at 42. 
407. Judicial Council of the Third Circuit v. Nolan, 414 U.S. 880 (1973) (mem.).   
408. Dana A. Remus, The Institutional Politics of Federal Judicial Conduct Regulation, 31 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 33, 41 (2012). 
409. See, e.g., Imperial, 481 F.2d at 42 (“The circuit council, while composed of judges, is an 
administrative body, and not a court.”).   
410. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. 
No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (codified as 28 U.S.C § 372 (2012)).  See also United States v. Washington, 
98 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 1966) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (acknowledging Chandler 
was the impetus for the 1980 Act). 
411. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, § 3(a)(6), 
94 Stat. at 2037. 
412. Cf. Anthony J. Scirica, Judicial Governance and Judicial Independence, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 779, 792 
(2015) (discussing a different bill founded upon questions of “the judiciary’s ability to self-regulate[,]” 
where speakers at its hearing argued the bill would “strengthen judicial independence and give the 
public ‘greater faith’ in the judiciary”). 
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preventing the disabled judge from serving on cases.413  This Act was part 
of an update to both 28 U.S.C. §§ 331 and 332.414  The federal courts have 
interpreted the 1980 Act as empowering the judicial councils to internally 
investigate the conduct of district court judges, which includes equating a 
lack of “judicial temperament” to an inability to perform judicial duties.415  
In 1980, Judge Gerhard Gesell of the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia noted that the 1980 Act, unlike the 1939 Act 
establishing the judicial councils, was an express statutory grant of authority 
to the Judicial Branch “to put its own house in order.”416 
Another significant addition to judicial governance and the authority of 
the judicial councils was enacted in 2002.417  Now, when an aggrieved 
person or party files a complaint against a judge, the chief judge on the court 
of appeals determines whether the complaint is frivolous or should be 
 
413. 28 U.S.C § 372(b) (2012). 
414. Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, § 3(a), 94 Stat. 
at 2035, 2038–39.   
415. See, e.g., McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct, 83 F. Supp. 2d 135, 140 
(D. D.C. 1999) (“The conduct targeted by the Act ranges from such intangibles as a lack of ‘judicial 
temperament’ to patterns of abusive behavior that threatens to undermine the integrity of the judiciary 
as a whole, as well as behavior symptomatic of an underlying disease.”), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 
McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct, 264 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  This decision 
originated within the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in which the Judicial Council for that 
circuit determined that Judge John J. McBryde of the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Texas had engaged in “conduct prejudicial to the effective administration of the business 
of the courts.”  Id. at 139.  The Council reprimanded Judge McBryde and disqualified him from hearing 
new cases for a one year period.  Id.  He was also prohibited from hearing cases with certain attorneys 
for a three-year period.  Id.  When Judge McBryde challenged the decision, the District Court for the 
District of Columbia was appointed to determine the appeal.  Id. at 135.  The District Court in this 
decision alleged that McBryde had adopted Justice Douglas’s dissent in his arguments that only 
Congress could discipline him in this manner.  Id. at 154, 156.  The difference, however, between 
Chandler II and McBryde, is that by the time of McBryde’s appeal, Congress had authorized the Council 
to act as it had.  See id. at 156 (recognizing a group of judges may act “in an administrative capacity to 
investigate and remedy ‘conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the 
business of the courts’” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1))); Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct 
and Disability Act of 1980, § 3(c), 94 Stat. at 2040 (authorizing, in 1980, judicial councils to act as they 
did in McBryde); Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 142 (warning of “a blatant effort on the part of the Council . . . 
to make Judge Chandler a ‘second-class judge,’ depriving him of the full power of his office[,]” and 
stressing a lack of authority, both in the Constitution and in statutes, authorizing judges to appropriate 
such authority ).   
416. Hastings v. Judicial Conference of U.S., 593 F. Supp. 1371, 1374 (D. D.C. 1984), aff’d in 
part and vacated in part, Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the U.S., 770 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985).   
417. Judicial Improvements Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1848 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–64 (2012)).   
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investigated.418  Informal investigations that result in counseling do not 
require a council’s intervention.419  If a chief judge determines that no 
formal investigation is necessary, neither the complaining party nor the 
judge has standing to challenge this determination in court.420  However, if 
the chief judge determines that an investigation is necessary, she or he may 
refer the matter to a judicial council that, in turn, can decide by a majority 
vote whether to investigate the complaint by the appointment of five 
judges.421   
One improvement since Chandler II is that there is now a minimum 
requirement that two district court judges must serve on an investigation 
panel—in the event that the subject of the complaint is a district court 
judge.422  The chief judge may also convene an investigation panel 
composed of the chief judge, and an equal number of district court and 
circuit court judges.423  In the event the chief judge forms such an 
investigation panel, the panel may only make recommendations to the 
circuit’s judicial council.424  A judicial council, in turn, determines whether 
 
418. 28 U.S.C. § 352(b) (2012). 
419. Id. § 352(a). 
420. Id. § 352(c).  This section reads: 
A complainant or judge aggrieved by a final order of the chief judge under this section may 
petition the judicial council of the circuit for review thereof.  The denial of a petition for review 
of the chief judge’s order shall be final and conclusive and shall not be judicially reviewable on 
appeal or otherwise. 
Id. 
421. Id. § 352(d).  “Each judicial council may, pursuant to rules prescribed under section 358, 
refer a petition for review filed under subsection (c) to a panel of no fewer than [five] members of the 
council, at least [two] of whom shall be district judges.”  Id. 
422. Id. 
423. Id. § 353(a).  Specifically, section 353(a) reads:  
Appointment.—If the chief judge does not enter an order under section 352(b), the chief judge 
shall promptly— 
(1) appoint himself or herself and equal numbers of circuit and district judges of the circuit to a 
special committee to investigate the facts and allegations contained in the complaint;  
(2) certify the complaint and any other documents pertaining thereto to each member of such 
committee; and  
(3) provide written notice to the complainant and the judge whose conduct is the subject of the 
complaint of the action taken under this subsection. 
Id. 
424. Id. § 353(c).  Section 353(c) explains that a committee conducting an investigation must 
execute such investigation as thorough as necessary.  Id.  The committee is required to “file a 
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to dismiss the complaint, investigate further, or “take such action as is 
appropriate to assure the effective and expeditious administration of the 
business of the courts within the circuit.”425  A judicial council has the 
authority to prevent the assignment of new cases to a trial judge, as well as 
the authority to privately or publicly reprimand or censure the judge.426  
However, any order prohibiting the assignment of new cases to a judge must 
have a defined termination date.427  The Judicial Conference is the only 
level of review to which a judge is entitled when challenging a council’s 
disciplinary decision.428  The Conference may recommend impeachment to 
Congress, adopt the judicial council’s determination, or make a separate 
determination.429  Again, such determinations are not judicially 
reviewable.430 
While Congress has provided a right of notice for investigated judges, 
there is no right for an amicus brief to be filed on behalf of a judge, and 
there is an absence of a standard of proof required to justify any quantum 
of discipline against a judge.431  Instead, Congress left to the judicial 
 
comprehensive written report . . . with the judicial council of the circuit.”  Id.  “Such report shall present 
both the findings of the investigation and the committee’s recommendations for necessary and 
appropriate action by the judicial council of the circuit.”  Id. 
425. Id. § 354(a)(1)(C). 
426. Id. § 354(a)(2)(A). 
427. Id. § 354(a)(2)(A)(i). 
428. See id. § 355 (allowing investigated judges to seek an independent review of a judicial 
council’s determination by the Judicial Conference); see also id. § 357 (setting forth the restriction for 
judicial review).  Particularly, section 357(a) states: “A complainant or judge aggrieved by an action of 
the judicial council under section 354 may petition the Judicial Conference of the United States for 
review thereof.”  Id. 357(a).  This section allows the Judicial Conference, or a standing committee, to 
grant or deny filed petitions.  Id. 357(b).  
429. Id. § 355(b). 
430. Id. § 357(c) (refusing judicial review of final decision). 
431. In particular, section 358(b) requires rules promulgated under subsection (a) to include 
terms requiring: 
(1) adequate prior notice of any investigation be given in writing to the judge whose conduct is 
the subject of a complaint under this chapter;  
(2) the judge whose conduct is the subject of a complaint under this chapter be afforded an 
opportunity to appear (in person or by counsel) at proceedings conducted by the investigating 
panel, to present oral and documentary evidence, to compel the attendance of witnesses or the 
production of documents, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present argument orally or in 
writing; and  
(3) the complainant be afforded an opportunity to appear at proceedings conducted by the 
investigating panel, if the panel concludes that the complainant could offer substantial 
information. 
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councils and the Judicial Conference the authority to prescribe rules for the 
conduct of their own proceedings.432  While Congress adhered to the 
separation of powers principles in enacting these procedures, the lack of a 
continuous legal standard of proof remains a deficiency for both the rights 
of an individual judge as well as a potential source to undermine the 
independence of trial judges.  Chandler II should have served as a warning to 
cure this deficiency. 
B. Judicial Use of Chandler 
It is true that in the past two decades the judicial councils have addressed 
allegations of judicial misconduct far more transparently and appropriately 
than when the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit examined 
Judge Chandler in 1965.  For instance, in 2010, the Judicial Council for the 
Ninth Circuit held that the judicial councils are not the appropriate vehicle 
for reviewing a judge’s decision not to recuse himself or herself when 
accused of bias.433  But transparency has not been true in all matters.   
In 2005, the Judicial Council for the Second Circuit admonished a judge 
who—during a 2004 American Constitutional Law Society meeting—
analogized the Supreme Court’s Bush v. Gore434 decision to the 1922 
installation of Benito Mussolini as Italian Prime Minister by King Victor 
Emmanuel III, and encouraged the audience not to vote for George W. 
Bush.435  The Judicial Council for the Second Circuit did not inform the 
public that the subject of the investigation was Judge Guido Calabresi, even 
though it found that Judge Calabresi had violated a prohibition within the 
judicial ethics canons.436  On the other hand, in 2014, the Judicial 
Conference Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability determined that 
the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council’s reprimand of Judge Richard F. Cebull 
(of the United States District Court for the District of Montana) was 
meritorious as it was based on the fact that Judge Cebull had sent racist 
 
Id. § 358(b).  Section 359(b) reads: “No person shall be granted the right to intervene or to appear as 
amicus curiae in any proceeding before a judicial council or the Judicial Conference under this chapter.”  
Id. § 359(b). 
432. Id. § 358(b). 
433. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 605 F.3d 1060, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010). 
434. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).   
435. In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 404 F.3d 688, 700 (2d Cir. Jud. Council 2005). 
436. Id. 
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e-mails regarding President Barack Obama.437  The difference between 
Judge Calabresi and Judge Cebull is that Judge Cebull expressly waived 
confidentiality.438 
In 2008, the Judicial Conference promulgated rules governing 
investigations by judicial councils.439  The rules took effect following a 
committee headed by Justice Steven Breyer, and were drafted to compliment 
the 1980 Judicial Conduct and Disability Act.440  Once a complaint against 
a judge is forwarded to the chief judge of a court of appeals, the chief judge 
must determine whether there is “clear and convincing evidence” of 
misconduct, and if so, whether to forward the complaint for a formal 
investigation.441  This is the only step in which a legal standard exists.442  
As a result, the federal judiciary has not adequately addressed Chandler II’s 
key deficiency, that is, the lack of a clear legal standard for determining 
judicial misconduct throughout the entire process, as well as standards for 
the chosen remedies. 
Since its issuance, Chandler II has been cited over one hundred times—
generally for the proposition that appellate judges serving in their council 
capacity possess supervisory authority over lower court judges.443  As an 
example, in In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation,444 the Court of 
 
437. See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 751 F.3d 611, 613 (Jud. Conf. U.S. 2014) 
(finding the investigation was warranted based on an email sent from a judicial account making 
race-related remark about President Obama and his mother after “this incident became public through 
media reports”). 
438. Compare id. at 614 (expressly waiving confidentiality), with Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 
404 F.3d at 700 (failing to expressly waive confidentiality).   
439. RULES FOR JUD. CONDUCT, supra note 118.  See generally Arthur D. Hellman, When Judges 
Are Accused: An Initial Look at the New Federal Judicial Misconduct Rules, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 325, 325–29 (2008) (“This article examines the newly adopted misconduct rules against 
the background of these recent controversies and the concerns they have generated in Congress . . . .”). 
440. Scirica, supra note 412, at 787.  
441. GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY vol. 2, pt. E, ch. 3, art. II, r. 5 (JUD. CONF. U.S. 2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/guide-vol02e-ch03.pdf [perma.cc/9DTK-B8MZ]. 
442. See generally id. at vol. 2, pt. E, ch. 3 (promulgating the “clear and convincing” standard—
and only the “clear and convincing” standard).   
443. See, e.g., In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation, 783 F.2d 1488, 1505 
(11th Cir. Jud. Council 1986) (“The majority in Chandler [II] indicated that there was no constitutional 
obstacle to the broadly worded grant of authority to judicial councils . . . .”), superseded by statute, Judicial 
Discipline & Removal Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5124 (1990) (codified as 
28 U.S.C § 332(d)(2) (2012)).   
444. In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation, 783 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. Jud. Council 1986), 
superseded by statute, Judicial Discipline & Removal Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 
5124 (1990) (codified as 28 U.S.C § 332(d)(2) (2012)). 
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Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted that the Burger Court had 
recognized that some “management power” existed in the judicial councils, 
but the appellate court also correctly discerned that the Chandler II majority 
never determined whether the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit had 
exceeded its authority.445  The Eleventh Circuit also opined that Justice 
Douglas and Justice Black had viewed United States District Courts as 
“mere collections of individual judges, each of whom is a complete law unto 
himself or herself.”446  Neither Justice Douglas nor Justice Black 
propounded this theory—but it does seem to be the appellate court’s 
interpretation of their dissents.447  The In re Certain Complaints case arose 
from United States District Court Judge Alcee Hastings’s challenge to a 
judicial investigation of his conduct.448  This investigation was organized 
pursuant to the 1980 statutory addition to the original act which enabled the 
councils to investigate the conduct of lower court judges.449  As a result, 
Chandler II had only indirect applicability to the issue before the Eleventh 
Circuit, but one might still find the characterization of the dissent troubling.  
Not only is the “complete law unto himself or herself” absent from Justice 
Douglas’ dissent, but at no time did Justice Douglas or Justice Black suggest 
that case assignment schemes from district court chief judges were 
unconstitutional, or that judicial discipline could only originate with 
Congress.450 
In 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed a United 
States district court judge’s refusal to permit a Massachusetts-based 
Assistant United States Attorney to prosecute a trial in Nevada against Bank 
of America unless the United States Attorney for the District of Nevada 




447. Compare Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 129–43 (“Once a federal judge is confirmed by the Senate 
and takes his oath, he is independent of every other judge.  He commonly works with other federal 
judges who are likewise sovereign.  But neither one alone nor any number banded together can act as 
censor and place sanctions on him.”), with Certain Complaints, 783 F.2d at 1505 (“We read Chandler as 
rejecting any fixed notion . . . that courts are mere collections of individual judges, each of whom is a 
complete law unto himself or herself.  Two of the justices who participated in Chandler, Justices Douglas 
and Black, did indeed take this view, but in dissent.”).   
448. Certain Complaints, 783 F.2d at 1491. 
449. Id.  
450. Id. at 1505; see generally Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 129–43 (expressing a view different from 
that extended by the Certain Complaints opinion).   
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were capable of prosecuting the case.451  Apparently, the district court 
judge, Robert Clive Jones, had instituted a policy preventing pro hac vice 
attorneys from appearing in his court.452  The majority of the appellate 
court found that, because Jones had reversed his order after the United 
States filed a writ of mandamus, and that the error of denying pro hac vice 
appearances would likely not be repeated, they were not required to  grant 
the writ.453  However, Judge John Clifford Wallace, in his concurrence, 
cited to Chandler II for the proposition that the Judicial Council for the 
Ninth Circuit possessed the authority to require the district court to permit 
federal prosecutors to appear in the district court as a matter of ensuring 
court efficiency, and that formal mandamus writs were a misuse of the 
Court’s time.454  It would be reasonable to believe that Judge Wallace’s 
interpretation of Chandler II’s applicability to a council’s administrative 
authority over a district court judge’s rule making is a sound analysis. 
Moreover, the influence of the Court’s handling of Chandler II reached 
beyond the United States.  On July 13, 1965, Lucien Cardin (the Minister of 
Justice and Attorney General of Canada) asked Ivan Cleveland Rand (a 
retired Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada) to lead an inquiry into the 
conduct of Justice Leo Landreville, a judge on the Ontario Supreme 
Court.455  Like Judge Chandler, Justice Landreville had been accused of 
improper fiscal and business relationships.456  In Justice Landreville’s case, 
he was accused of accepting monies from the Northern Ontario Natural 
Gas Corporation.457  Up until this point, no Canadian judge had ever faced 
impeachment, and retired Justice Rand decided to quietly ascertain methods 
 
451. In re United States, 791 F.3d 945, 949–50 (9th Cir. 2015). 
452. Id. at 950. 
453. Id. at 951. 
454. Id. at 961 (Wallace, J., concurring) (citing Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 86 n.7).   
455. See S.A. Scott, Editor’s Diary, The Search for an Amending Process 1960–1967, 12 MCGILL L.J. 
337, 361, 367 (1966–1967) (asserting Lucien Cardin became “Minister of Justice and Attorney-General 
for Canada” on July 7, 1965, and that he retired April 4, 1967); PRIVY COUNCIL, INQUIRY RE: THE 
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE LEO A. LANDREVILLE 1 (1966) [hereinafter PRIVY COUNCIL, INQUIRY 
RE: LANDREVILLE], available at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/bcp-pco/Z1-
1966-2-eng.pdf [perma.cc/D3C9-YXDK] (“[O]n the recommendation of the Minister of Justice, 
advise that the Honourable Ivan Cleveland Rand, of Moncton, in the Province of New Brunswick, be 
appointed Commissioner under Part I of the Inquiries Act to inquire into the dealings of the 
Honourable Mr. Justice Leo A. Landreville . . . .”).   
456. See PRIVY COUNCIL, INQUIRY RE: LANDREVILLE, supra note 455, at 1, 3 (pointing out 
Landreville’s relationship with Ralph K. Farris).   
457. See id. (“[C]ircumstances revolving around the acquisition of 7,5000 shares of NONG for 
which he paid no consideration.”). 
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of judicial discipline in the United States.458  He was given the name and 
address of Warren Olney III (Director of the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts) for assistance.459  The retired Justice Rand’s effort to 
seek out information beyond and outside of the Court’s Chandler II opinion 
illustrates a vital concern for the decision’s potential to undermine judicial 
independence extending beyond the United States. 
V.    CONCLUSION 
It is doubtful that Chief Justice Burger and the Court’s majority intended 
for Chandler II to permit an encroachment into the independence of trial 
judges by appellate judges under the guise of supervision—there is nothing 
in the decision’s text to suggest this was the case.  Although this Article has 
necessarily focused on the federal judiciary, there is more than a minor 
anecdotal indicium in the state courts that Chandler II can be interpreted as 
permitting such an encroachment.  In Halverson v. Hardcastle,460 the Nevada 
Supreme Court, relying on Chandler II, determined that the chief trial judge’s 
administrative oversight of a trial judge could include aspects of judicial 
punishment in regard to the judge’s performance, even though the state 
legislature had not acted against the judge.461   
But not all state appellate courts have mirrored the Nevada court.  In 
1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (describing its functions which are 
equivalent to the judicial councils in investigating allegations of judicial 
malfeasance) noted that the burden of proof by clear and convincing 
evidence rests with the accusation’s proponent and not the subject judge—
throughout the entirety of the investigatory proceedings—and then quoted 
 
458. See Letter to Ivan C. Rand, Former Justice, Canadian Supreme Court (Mar. 1, 1966) (on 
file with the Nat’l Archives of Can.) (suggesting Rand inquired into the names and addresses of U.S. 
officials who might be in a position to help with the mechanics of reviewing judicial conduct).   
459. See id. (listing Director Olney as a contact).   
460. Halverson v. Hardcastle, 163 P.3d 428 (Nev. 2007).   
461. Id. at 444–45; see also In re Mussman, 289 A.2d 403, 404–05 (N.H. 1972) (announcing the 
authority to investigate a state trial judge and to remove that judge from further hearings when 
warranted, but dismissing the action because it had not yet ripened).  In this decision, the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court determined that it possessed the authority to investigate the conduct of a 
state trial judge as well as remove him from hearing further cases, but then decided the issue was not 
ripe.  Id.  The trial judge in question was facing a disbarment proceeding by the state board of 
professional responsibility and the state supreme court sensibly, in the author’s view, decided to wait 
to investigate so as not to prejudice a separate investigation, particularly since the trial judge had been 
removed from pending trials.  Id. 
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Justice Black’s dissent as a warning against encroachment into judicial 
independence.462   
Thus, one state’s judiciary has utilized Chandler II as a means for senior 
judges or judicial bodies to discipline a judge without regard to the state 
legislature, and another state has cautioned against Chandler II’s use to this 
effect.  In doing so, the second state impliedly pointed out Chandler II’s key 
deficiency that remains to this day—the lack of a defined burden of proof 
on the councils and Conference in investigating and assessing judicial 
misconduct.   
As a decision which stands for the proposition that the judiciary should 
have the administrative rule-making authority or the ability for a council to 
“referee” disputes between judges, Chandler II does present a reasonable 
citation.  On the other hand, Chief Justice Burger’s disregard of the recent 
legal and political history underlying Judge Chandler’s appeals led the 
majority to issuing a rash decision that opened the possibility of 
encroachments into judicial independence by administrative bodies and 
higher courts, and, in turn, which could undermine a litigant’s confidence in 
an independent and impartial judiciary.  While there may be no need for a 
complete denunciation of Chandler II, the judiciary should recognize a 
remaining danger to judicial independence created by the flawed decision, 
and should limit the use of that decision to purely administrative issues, 
rather than legal issues. 
 
462. See In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 534 (Pa. 1992) (“The hope for an independent judiciary will 
prove to have been no more than an evanescent dream.” (quoting Chandler II, 398 U.S. at 143 (Black, J., 
dissenting))). 
